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Transfrontier Conservation Areas of Southern Africa and Community Involvement in the
Context of International
Director: Perry Brown
Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) can be defined as large, contiguous
protected areas spanning international boundaries. Over the past decade, interest in
TFCAs in southern Africa has exploded. Much of this interest can be attributed to the
plethora of benefits touted by proponents, a number of which are community-based. The
realization of community-based benefits requires local communities to be intimately
involved in the TFCA management and planning process. In addition to being a desired
requisite for TFCA initiatives, community involvement may also be a mandate of
international law.
Recognizing that TFCAs are international entities and - in theory - subject to
international law, this study seeks to assess the current and potential role of international
law in TFCA-based community involvement. At present, there are treaties and
conventions in place that suggest community involvement in TFCA initiatives is a
mandate of international law (e.g., the Treaty of the Southern African Development
Community). This study assessed how the mandate of international law to involve local
communities in TFCA initiatives has been recognized and/or implemented and identified
the necessary conditions and institutions needed to insure that it is recognized and/or
implemented.
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Chapter

1

INTRODUCTION

In areas where it is hard to separate land, wildlife, and communities, it may seem
that substantial participation from local communities in environmental decision-making
processes is a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, many pieces of international law1 that
recognize communities as a stakeholder and encourage community involvement in
carrying out the law do not clearly define the role of communities in the implementation
of the agreement. Even if the role of communities is clearly defined, nation-states still
may not involve them in the implementation process. Transfrontier conservation areas of
southern Africa provide one such venue to investigate this phenomenon.
Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) are ecological areas of protection that
straddle the boundaries of two or more countries, encompassing one or more protected
areas, as well as multiple resource areas (South African Govt. Dept, of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism 2002). Transfrontier conservation areas are also known as
international peace parks (Carroll 1979), transfrontier conservation and development
areas (PPF 2002), transfrontier parks (PPF 2002), transfrontier nature reserves (Thorsell
and Harrison 1990), transboundary parks (Kenney 1990), and cross-border parks
(McNeely 1993), all of which depend on the popular terminology of the time and the
TFCA’s intended purpose. For example, the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park2 is

1 International law is the body o f rules and agreements that nation states consider to be binding in their mutual relations.
2 A transfrontierpark is a TFCA where theprimary propose is wildlife conservation (South African Govt. Dept, o f Environmental Affairs
and Tourism 2002).
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composed of Kruger National Park of South Africa, Gonarezhou National Park of
Zimbabwe, and the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique (see Fig. 1).

Zimbabwe
Gonarezhou
National Park
Limpopo
National Park
Kruger
National Park

Mozambique
South
Africa
The Great
Limpopo
TFCA

Fig. 1 - The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park

Upon their establishment, TFCAs are managed as a single ecological province for
multiple purposes including wildlife conservation, increased biodiversity, restoration of
wildlife migration routes, economic benefit through eco-tourism, creation of buffer zones
between countries (particularly those with disputed borders), and as a symbolic gesture of
peace and re-establishment of societal cross-border relationships. They are, however, no
panacea for natural resource management. As a relatively young approach to
international protected area management, TFCAs have experienced difficulties,
particularly in their interface with local communities. For instance, concerns have been
raised regarding the legal basis for community involvement, the scale of community
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involvement, and how power is devolved to communities (Metcalfe 1999). The purpose
of this research is to investigate these concerns in the context of international law.

Communities Defined
For the purposes of this study, a community is defined as a group of people
residing in the same geographic locality and under the same government. Communities
are complex and heterogeneous systems composed of individuals differentiated by many
qualities such as status, political and economic power, religion, social prestige, and
intentions (Barrow and Murphree 2001). As such, communities will be comprised of
individuals with differing principles and, in turn, different opinions of how TFCAs
should be managed. These differences can potentially complicate the process of
community involvement in TFCA management (Bell 1999). Nevertheless, the role of
communities in ensuring conservation and sound TFCA management has been
championed by many (e.g., see Danby 1997, Linde et al. 2001, and Metcalfe 1999). In
this spirit, international law has recognized the important role communities can play in
implementing international environmental agreements such as TFCA initiatives.

Transfrontier conservation areas and international law as a basis for community
involvement
Transfrontier conservation areas are established through multilateral treaties
between nation-states agreeing to manage the areas for the variety of purposes outlined
above. These treaties carry the force of international law, which, in theory, binds the
nation-states to abide by the stipulations of the agreement. One of the stipulations
outlined in many TFCA agreements in southern Africa is that local communities are to
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play an active role in TFCA management. The inclusion of this stipulation is consistent
with the objectives of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (the
Treaty of SADC), a piece of international law observed by virtually all of southern
'X

—

•

Africa. The Treaty of SADC states that SADC Member States are to cooperate in the
areas of “natural resources and the environment” and “encourage the people o f the
Region and their institutions to undertake initiatives to develop economic, social and
cultural ties across the Region and to participate fully in the implementation of the
programs and projects of SADC.” [Emphasis added] (Article 21 § 3(e), Article 5 § 2(b)).
Transfrontier conservation area initiatives are an example of cooperation among Member
States in the area of natural resources and the environment that strive to develop
“economic, social, and cultural ties” across the region. Thus, Member States are
essentially mandated to encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives. The
Treaty of SADC further declares that Member States “shall take all necessary steps to
accord this Treaty the force of national law” and “take all steps to ensure the uniform
application of this treaty.” (Article 6 § 4 and § 5). Therefore, it becomes international
and national policy of all Member States to encourage the full involvement of local
communities in the implementation of TFCA initiatives. It is this principle that shaped
the four fundamental goals of the study:
1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements)4;
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3 Member States are states that have signed the Treaty. Presently, all nation-states in southern Africa participating in TFCA
initiatives are also SADC Member States.
4 Formal agreements are written rules that are considered legally binding.
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3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement formalization
desirable or undesirable.
Transfrontier conservation areas of southern Africa have pioneered a means of
large-scale conservation across international boundaries. There have been obstacles,
though, in their establishment and development, and some of these obstacles relate to the
role of local communities in their establishment and management. Through this study, a
better understanding of the complex relationship between TFCAs, international law, and
community involvement will be gained. This assessment then might serve as both a
descriptive and prescriptive analysis of the implications of international law for TFCAs
and provide guidance for the roles and behavior of communities toward TFCAs
worldwide.

5

Chapter

2

FRAMEWORKS OF STUDY

The study of TFCAs and the role of local communities in the context of
international law is neither rich in history nor elementary. Nevertheless, this chapter is
designed to provide a basic understanding of TFCAs, local community involvement in
TFCA initiatives, and international law (as related to community involvement in TFCA
initiatives). The chapter begins with a brief overview of TFCA history, mechanics of
establishment, purposes and objectives, and the challenges they face. Next, local
community involvement in TFCA initiatives is discussed; this discussion includes the
various roles local communities may have in TFCA initiatives, the motives underlying
local community involvement, and the principle constraints preventing the realization of
desired benefits. Following this analysis, the chapter continues with an analysis of relevant
international law, with particular attention paid to the Treaty of SADC and its resulting
protocols and policies. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of research
objectives that were shaped through the literature review. In essence, this chapter lays the
foundation upon which the remainder of the study is based.

Transfrontier Conservation Areas
While interest in TFCA initiatives has grown exponentially in the past decade, they
are not entirely a product of contemporary thought. The first protected area to cross
international boundaries in Africa (and arguably in the world) was Albert National Park,
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established in 1925, between Rwanda and Burundi. The Park was formed by the Belgian
colonial regime for the purpose of conserving transboundary natural resources (Linde et. al.
2001). After both countries’ independence in the early 1960’s, the Rwandan portion
became Parc des Volcans (Volcanoes National Park) and the Urundi portion became
Virunga National Park (Wilkie et al. 2001). Following these designations, Albert National
Park ceased to exist and the area was no longer managed as a single unit. While it existed
for only a few decades, Albert National Park was the forerunner of what would become a
significant movement in transboundary natural resource cooperation in Africa, particularly
southern Africa.
On April 7, 1999 the first post-colonial TFCA was established in Africa when
Botswana and South Africa signed a bilateral agreement creating the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, composed of the KalahariGemsbok National Park of South Africa and the Gemsbok National Park of Botswana,
has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, operating through a verbal agreement between the
South African and Botswanan conservation authorities (National Parks Board - South
Africa and Dept, of Wildlife and National Parks - Botswana 1997). Since the 1999
establishment of The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, major movements have been
underway in South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia,
Botswana, Tanzania, and Swaziland to formally establish large TFCAs for a multitude of
purposes related to natural resource management. Much of the success of the modem
TFCA movement can be attributed to earnest work and financial support from non
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Peace Parks Foundation, World Wildlife
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Fund, World Bank, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
On May 27,1990, the President of the Peace Parks Foundation - Dr. Anton
Rupert, met with Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano to discuss the possibility of
establishing permanent links between protected areas in southern Mozambique and thenadjacent counterparts in South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (Masterson 1999).
Rupert’s meeting resulted in Chissano’s request for the World Wildlife Fund of South
Africa to conduct a feasibility study, which was completed and submitted to the
government of Mozambique in September of 1991 (Tinley 1991). The complexity of
establishing these links was soon realized and the Mozambiquan Council of Ministers
recommended further studies to assess the political, social, economic, and ecological
dimensions of the potential links (Jones 2001). This particular study, funded by the
Global Environment Facility, through the World Bank, suggested an important shift away
from the idea of protected national parks towards more emphasis on multiple use by
indigenous people and communities (Jones 2001 and PPF 2003). In the latter part of
1996, when the studies were finalized, it also became evident that there was an increasing
interest in southern Africa as a tourist destination, and development of TFCA initiatives
would be integral in creating an economic driving force that would result in new jobs
(PPF 2003). Following the release of the study, three TFCAs - Gaza-KrugerGonarezhou (currently known as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation and
Development Area), Lubombo, and Chimanimani - were recommended for
establishment. The major TFCA projects currently underway in southern Africa are listed
in Table 1.
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Transfrontier Conservation Area

Participating Nation-states

|Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier
Conservation Park
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier
Park*
Kgalagadi
Lake Malawi/Nyasa/Niassa
Transfrontier Conservation Area
Limpopo/Shashe Transfrontier
Conservation Area
Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation
Area
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Area

South Africa and Namibia
South Africa, Mozambique, and
Zimbabwe
South Africa and Botswana
Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania
Botswana, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe
South Africa, Mozambique, and
Swaziland
South Africa and Lesotho

*The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was formerly known as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou
Transfrontier Park

Table 1. - Current Major Transfrontier Conservation Area Projects in
Southern Africa

Mechanics o f Establishment
Due to the multilateral nature of the initiatives, transfrontier conservation area
establishment is inherently a complex process. Nevertheless, patterns in actions and events
leading to the establishment of TFCAs can be observed (Danby 1997, Jones et al. 2001,
Linde et al. 2001, Metcalfe et. al. 1999, Sing et al. 1999, and Mohammed-Katerere 2001).
The process has begun with two or more land managing authorities (e.g., South Africa
National Parks or The Department of Wildlife and National Parks of Botswana)
establishing a dialogue and informally cooperating on the cross-border management of
natural resources. Depending on the objectives of the areas, nation-states then decide if
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they would like to continue to informally cooperate or enter into a formalized agreement
that provides a framework for substantial cooperation.

Purposes and Objectives o f TFCAs
Transfrontier conservation areas have and are being established for the realization
of benefits that can be classified as political, ecological, economic, socio-cultural, or a
combination thereof (see Fig. 2) (Danby 1997 and Fakir 2001). Ideally, TFCAs will
promote benefits in all four areas. Often, though, this is not the case and TFCAs are
established primarily for the realization of a smaller subset of benefits (Fakir 2001).
Political benefits were among the first to be recognized by TFCA planners. By
establishing TFCAs, a greater sense of neighborliness between participating nation-states is
hoped to be achieved. Transfrontier conservation areas also have been established to ease
tensions between nation-states in border disputes through the creation of a buffer zone. For
example, several transboundary parks in Germany and her neighbors were established
during post-war periods in an attempt to improve border relations (McNeil 1990).
Establishment of TFCAs also has become a centerpiece of the Central American peace
process. Here, TFCAs have been described as “icebreakers” whereby more controversial
border issues are introduced following an agreement upon the establishment of TFCAs as a
symbol of peace (Weed 1994).
Ecological benefits are among the most frequently cited and may be, along with
political benefits, considered the primary reason for the establishment of many TFCAs in
southern Africa. Transfrontier conservation areas, as large protected areas, have been
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shown to dramatically increase biodiversity and ecological health in comparison to smaller
protected areas (Diamond 1975 and Katerere et al. 2001). The promotion of ecological

Ecological - natural
resource and
environmental
protection,
biodiversity, creation
of larger reserves

Political - promotion of
peace and improved
international relations

Socio-cnltmal - preservation
and/ or restoration of cultural
integrity, interaction of cross
border indigenous peoples

Fig. 2 - Summary of Benefits Associated With TFCA Establishment

health and re-establishment of elephant migration routes was fundamental in creating the
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique (South
African Government Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2000).
Additionally, with respect to endangered species, TFCAs have a greater possibility of
sustaining minimum viable populations - the population large enough to avoid inbreeding
and withstand losses resulting from environmental processes (Burkey 1995 and Danby
1997).
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It also has been suggested that indigenous communities will benefit from TFCAs
(Ramutsindela 2002). National boundaries and lines on maps are a product of colonial
southern Africa (Omer-Cooper 1997), and prior to the arrival of the Dutch and British in
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, indigenous communities lived pastoral and huntergatherer lifestyles that, in most cases, were void of definitive territorial boundaries
(Shillington 1993). Where definitive territorial boundaries did exist, they were often
transected by the provincial demarcation of European colonists (Omer-Cooper 1997). It
has been proposed that through the creation of TFCAs, many estranged indigenous
communities will be able to reunite (Reid 2001). Transfrontier conservation areas also
could help surrounding communities experience improved social security and welfare
through stronger community-based property rights; improved livelihoods through
diversified, income-generating, land-use options; and improved collaboration with
government and private sectors (Metcalfe 1999).
In terms of economic benefits, TFCAs can foster significant growth for participating
nation-states and local communities through eco-tourism. According to the World Bank,
tourism is second only to oil in generating the world’s largest income (World Bank 1996).
Transfrontier conservation areas can prove to be more desirable to tourists than other
protected areas in that opportunities are expanded and human concentrations are allowed to
diffuse, which will purportedly lead to “high quality experiences” (Singh 1999). Hamilton
(1997) notes:
i t is more cost-effective and satisfying for the tourist to be able to visit
more than one park from his or her base, and even pay one
admission fee (e.g., boat trips across the border on Waterton lake for
Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park; river rafting between
Kluane/Tatshenshini-Alsek/Glacier Bay crossing three jurisdictions and
two countries; boat tours down the river border in the bilateral
Bohemian-Saxonian Switzerland in Germany and the Czech Republic)”
12

Other, more consumptive, economic benefits may include increased agriculture, forestry,
fisheries, hunting, and game farming, all of which are multi-million dollar industries in
southern Africa (Reid 1994, Singh 1999, and World Bank 1996).

Challenges
While the potential benefits of TFCAs are profound, they have presented many
challenges to participating governments, land management authorities, and local
communities, which have both impeded their establishment and provoked skepticism of
their worth (Fakir 2001 and Weis and Draper 2002). As with the benefits, the apparent
challenges facing TFCAs are generally social, political, or economic in nature. Challenges
might manifest before the establishment of a TFCA, following the establishment of a
TFCA, or both.
Given southern Africa’s colonial history, the relinquishment of a certain level of
national sovereignty to establish and manage a TFCA has presented political challenges
(Duffy 1997, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and Rosenberg and Korsmo 2001). Throughout
its colonial history, “ownership” of lands in southern Africa was tossed between Britain,
the Netherlands, Portugal, France, and Germany creating inconsistent governmental
regimes and institutional practices (Shillington 1993). Post-colonial southern Africa places
a significant emphasis on maintaining national sovereignty and nation-states are quick to
protect it. In some cases, the cross-border and collaborative governance of TFCAs has
been perceived as a threat to national sovereignty (Danby 1997). This challenge is not
peculiar to southern Africa, though. Political leaders in Central America have expressed a
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hesitancy to promote national parks crossing international borders “for fear that they are
somehow relinquishing control of national territory” (Arias and Nation-states 1992).
Aside from challenges related to sovereignty, perhaps the most salient political
challenge facing TFCAs is a lack of effective agreements. “Effective,” as used here, is not
synonymous with “legally binding,” where “legally binding” implies the presence of
systems of accountability. All TFCA agreements are considered legally binding under
international law, but transfrontier conservation area initiatives must also have appropriate
institutional structures and compatible legislation between participating countries in place
before they can be considered reasonably effective (Danby 1997, McNeely 1993, and Von
Malchus 1982).
Unlike the political challenges, the economic challenges faced by TFCAs have
generally only been experienced following their establishment (Fakir 2001). International
NGOs have been quick to fund start up costs and initial activities in southern African
TFCA initiatives; thus, financial cost is not typically a problem until after TFCAs are set
in place and funding from external sources fades (Richardson 2002 and World Bank
1996). The poor cost-effectiveness of TFCAs is partly a product of the narrow base upon
which they depend for income. TFCAs and other protected areas are heavily dependent on
tourism and eco-tourism as a source of post-NGO revenue (Belsky 1999 and Linde 2001).
While tourism might, in fact, be the second greatest global source of income, it has long
been recognized as a fickle and risky industry that experiences tremendous fluctuations
and is subject to global and national recessions as well as dominant interests of the time
(World Bank 1996). Such fluctuations can lead to unstable sources of revenue that can
dramatically affect the sustainability of a TFCA.
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As with political challenges, social challenges can manifest both before and
following the establishment of TFCAs. However, unlike political and economic
challenges, social challenges are difficult to identify, due to the fact that they may be a
result of several factors (including political and economic). For example, issues related to
the equal sharing and realization of economic benefits among local communities has
surfaced as a serious threat of an amiable relationship between local communities and
TFCAs. According to Neumann (2000), African communities tend, in the perception of
international NGOs dominated by western capital, to be divided into “good” and “bad
natives,” depending on how primitive they are. The more primitive they are, the “better”
they are and the more voice they have concerning TFCA issues and the more right they
have to stay in the area and reap the financial privileges of western donor attention.
While equal sharing and realization of benefits is certainly an important concern
among communities situated in and around TFCAs, many have argued that the greatest
threat to local communities and their rights is the failure to establish systems by which
nation-states protect community interests and involve local communities in the planning
and management of TFCAs (e.g. Metcalfe 1999, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, Murphree
1991). As a result, local communities develop resentment and mistrust toward participating
nation-states and a lost sense of ownership with respect to the areas (Agrawal and Gibson
1999 and Linde 2001). While many TFCA agreements have recognized the important role
local communities could play in the implementation of TFCA initiatives, rarely are systems
of accountability in place that bind nation-states to execute this recognition (Metcalfe
1999). Notwithstanding international law that requires nation-states to engage in a
collaborative dialogue with local communities concerning transboundary initiatives such as
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the establishment of TFCAs (i.e., the Treaty of SADC), follow through is not universal
(Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and SADC 1992).
It is this interface of TFCAs, the community, and international law that this study
addressed. However, before examining the dynamics of international law as applied to
community rights, we first proceed with an examination of the crucial, but often
questionable and contested, relationship between local communities and TFCAs of southern
Africa.

Transfrontier Conservation Areas of Southern Africa and Local Communities
The potential benefits of TFCAs to local communities have spawned a close
examination of the interface between the two. While past research identified
communities as a hindrance to conservation and preservation ideals, current authors
herald them as an important venue for implementing wise conservation practices
(Chambers and McBeth 1992, Chitere 1994, and Etzioni 1996). According to a 1999
Food and Agriculture Organization survey, more than fifty countries (including many in
southern Africa) report that they “actively” involve local communities in managing their
protected areas. Current conservation projects, including TFCA initiatives, are focused
not only on protecting lands and resources, but also on protecting community rights and
concerns (Mayoral-Phillips 2002).
The growth of community involvement in conservation projects can be attributed
to several factors. One factor is that international agencies including the World Bank,
Worldwide Fund for Nature, Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, the
Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and USAID have all directed enormous
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sums of money and effort toward community-based conservation and resource
management^. A second factor is that in areas where communities are engaged in
subsistence lifestyles, the capacity of nation-states to coerce their citizens into unpopular
development and conservation programs that affect the resources upon which they are
dependent is limited (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). The weakness of state-centric policy in
this instance leaves few options other than community-based conservation (Weis and
Brandon 1992). The proliferation of democratic political structures in southern Africa
also has lead to an increasing demand for community participation, while
unrepresentative development and conservation projects have become not only
unattractive, but impractical as well.

An Operating Definition o f Local Communities
Research concerned with the interface of local communities and the environment
has shown that one of the first challenges is to develop an operational definition of “local
community” (Berkes 1989). There are several ways that “local community” has been
defined, and each is appropriate for different interests and research questions (Agrawal
and Gibson 1999, Barret 1999, Belsky 1999, and Corbet and Jones 2000). In this study,
local community is defined as a group of people residing in the same locality and under
the same government. This definition is in contrast to definitions of the local community
as a homogenous social structure or a group of people having common interests and
shared norms (e.g., Agrawal 1998). The definition used here is necessary since issues of

5 Community-based conservation and resource management is broadly defined in this study as natural resource management that places a
special and significant emphasis on community involvement and participation.
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international law and nation-state policy deal with local communities defined by
territorial boundaries. This definition permits two critical assumptions:
•

Communities are complex and heterogeneous systems composed of individuals
differentiated by many qualities such as status, political and economic power,
religion, social prestige, and intentions (Chambers and McBeth 1992)

•

Local communities may be composed of individuals with differing and, possibly,
polarized views of TFCAs and their management (Chitere 1994, Etzioni 1996, and
Metcalfe 1999).

These characteristics may either enable or limit the ability of collaborative management of
TFCAs to succeed. Provided a diverse representation from the community participates in
the TFCA planning and management processes, the potential exists that the presentation of
many viewpoints and perspectives will be presented. Alternatively, community diversity
can hinder planning and management processes when systems for conflict resolution are
not in place (Weed 1994).
In addition to the global assumptions regarding local communities, historical factors
have lead to specific assumptions regarding local communities of southern Africa. For
example,
• Indigenous peoples were not active participants in the colonial discourse related to
conservation (Crosby 1986 and Anderson and Grove 1987).
• Nearly all communities have a rich and diverse heritage of indigenous knowledge
(Metcalfe 1999).
Both of these factors contribute to interesting and sometimes unpredictable responses by
local communities to TFCA initiatives. Weis and Draper (2002) noted that some local
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communities have perceived TFCA initiatives as a mechanism by which post-colonial
whites legitimize (vis-a-vis environmental protection) the taking of lands and rights of
local communities. Despite the complexity of communities and the relationships between
local communities and surrounding TFCAs, exploration of the challenges and
opportunities facing local communities and their role in TFCA initiatives has been rare.

The Role o f Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives
The role of local communities in southern African conservation has been marginal
at best (Anderson and Groves 1987, Crosby 1986, and Omer-Cooper 1997). This has been
particularly evident in South Africa where, before the fall of the apartheid6 regime in 1994,
local communities (particularly indigenous ones) had no voice whatsoever in conservation
practices (Omer-Cooper 1997 and Shillington 1993). Furthermore, British and Dutch
colonists regularly dislocated indigenous communities to reserves to make way for larger
plantation style farms and colonial development (Omer-Cooper 1997 and Shillington
1993). With the fall of apartheid in South Africa and the rise of democracy, indigenous
communities became more sessile and began to speak with a louder and more influential
voice in conservation matters. Given that the institutionalization of democracy in South
Africa and the establishment of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in 1999 occurred within a
relatively short period of time, The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is one of the first
conservation initiatives in South Africa to actively involve and seek participation from
local communities.

6 The apartheid government was a legal framework, introduced by Dutch Colonists, which instituted white supremacy and was
the dominant political ideology in South Africa from 1948-1994.
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The capacity to which community participation occurs and the mechanisms by
which it occurs varies across TFCAs (Metcalfe 1999). Metcalfe (1999) has identified 3
mutually exclusive approaches to community involvement in TFCA initiatives: TFCA
outreach (management for/with local communities), collaborative management
(management with/by local communities), and community-based management
(management by local communities). As Barrow and Murphree (2001) suggest, these
roles can be imagined as a continuum. The three roles identified above are merely points
along the continuum where a marked change in objectives occurs. The dynamics of each
approach are quite complex (see Table 2). It should be noted that each approach might be
appropriate in some places for specific purposes, and each has its own set of opportunities
and challenges that must be considered before implementation.
As indicated above, each possible role that local communities may play in TFCA
initiatives has dramatically different implications for the TFCAs themselves. For instance,
the dominant objective of “TFCA outreach” is “enhanced conservation and integrity of
protected areas and TFCAs.” This objective may often be sought by TFCA officials with
little or no involvement of local communities in the decision-making process. On the other
hand, the principles of “community-based conservation” stipulate that the needs of rural
livelihoods must be met first, with conservation integrated as an important secondary
objective. This approach recognizes that where resources for living are insufficient,
protected area resources might be lost. In the absence of external control, the TFCA is
maintained only when it is economically or culturally viable.
While “collaborative management” is a middle-ground compromise, it presents a special
set of challenges. Under collaborative management, planning is done jointly and under the
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assumption that the TFCA will be used for multiple purposes. In the case where TFCA
officials and local communities share an equivalent level of power, this approach is highly
conducive to stalemates. Transfrontier conservation area officials might wish to protect
particular species of flora and fauna, while local communities might wish to harvest or
extract those same species for subsistence purposes (Danby 1997). With an equivalent
level of power held between the TFCA officials and local communities, there exists no
ultimate authority to resolve such a dispute if both parties refuse to compromise.
To resolve this issue, in most situations the traditional role of the community in
TFCA initiatives is a combination of TFCA outreach and collaborative management where
collaborative management is practiced unless both parties are locked in an irreconcilable
dispute, in which case the views and wishes of TFCA officials would trump that of local
communities (Adams and Hulme 2001, Bell 1999, Ezemvelo Kwa-Zulu-Natal Wildlife
2001, Griffin et. al. 1999, Kellert et. al. 2000, Metcalfe 1999, and Weis and Draper 2002)

Opportunities for Community Involvement in TFCA Initiatives
The objective of this study was to examine the roles outlined above in the context
of international law and the legal obligation to actively involve local communities in
TFCA initiatives. To understand why so many have advocated a legal mandate for
community involvement, it is first necessary to understand why communities wish to be
involved in the first place. Without the realization of benefits through either of the roles
discussed above, there is little incentive for communities to actively participate in TFCA
initiatives.
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TFCA Outreach

Collaborative
Management

Conservation
for/with local
communities

Conservation
with/by local
communities

TFCA development
dominated TFCA
officials. Local
communities are
subsidiary partners to
achieve TFCA
conservation
objectives
Enhanced
conservation and
integrity of protected
areas and TFCAs

TFCA dominated by
TFCA officials with
communities slowly
moving toward some
joint management
responsibilities.

Local community as
legal land entities join
protected area
authorities as full and
equal partners

Rural livelihoods:
needs met but
conservation needs to
be integrated

Who plans

Conservation of
TFCAs through
managed access to
multiple-use
resources
State-owned land and State-owned land
resources (e.g.
with mechanisms for
national parks, forest collaborative
and game reserves)
management of
certain resources
with the community.
Complex tenure and
ownership
arrangements.
TFCA officials with
The state with
conditional benefit
concessions toward
flow to local
joint management
communities.
and multiple use
Joint planning only
Joint planning of
on outreach activities multiple-use control

Who controls

TFCA authority

Joint authority

TFCA core
maintained for
national heritage and
benefit, but wider
TFCA manifests
land-use conflicts
and fragmentation

TFCA core
maintained for
national heritage.
Benefits shared with
local community
groups and
individuals. Use
may not be
sustainable and
species may be
affected.

Approach

Whose agenda

Dominant
objective

Ownership/tenure
status

Who owns the
process

Fate o f
conservation
resource

CommunityBased
Conservation
Conservation by
local communities

Local resource users
own land and resources
either de jure or de
facto. State may have
some control of last
resort.

Local community has
legal rights of control

Local community often
assisted by
advisors/administrators
Community authority
(democratic/traditional)
Where resource is
insignificant to rural
economics or culture, it
may be lost. Resource
maintained when
culturally/economically
viable.

Source: (Metcalfe 1999)

Table 2. Summary of the Roles of Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives

22

With that in mind, promoters of TFCAs in southern African have enumerated the benefits
of TFCAs for local communities. Four principle benefits have been described by
researchers and policy-makers (Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme and Inamdar et al. 1999,
Linde et al. 2001, Murphree 1999, Metcalfe 1999, and PPF 2002):
1. Improved economic health through diversified, income-generating, land-use
options and eco-tourism
2. Re-establishment of community relationships severed by colonial boundaries
3. Stronger community-based property rights
4. Improved collaboration and relations with governments, businesses, and other
communities (all of which includes those of other nation-states)

Challenges and Constraints to Community Involvement in TFCA Initiatives
As promising as local community involvement is in TFCA initiatives, the
challenges it presents are equally foreboding. In a broader context, the challenges facing
community-based conservation have been widely discussed (e.g. Barret and Arcese 1995,
Oates 1951, Ite 1996, Noss 1997, and Weis and Draper 2002). As with the benefits
associated with local community involvement in TFCA initiatives, the challenges and
constraints preventing the realization of benefits are economic, social, and political in
nature. Listed below are the primary challenges and constraints7.
Economic challenges arid constraints:
1. Economic viability of TFCAs
2. Equity in disbursement of benefits and costs

Social challenges and constraints:
3. Capacity of communities to effectively participate in TFCA decisions
4. Conflicts between cultural heritage and conservation priorities
5. Apathy of local community members toward participation

7 Metcalfe (1999), Mohammed-Katerere (2001), and Weis and Diaper (2002) give a more complete treatment o f challenges and
constraints related to communities and TFCAs
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Political challenges and constraints:
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Tense relationships between stakeholders
Inadequate systems of conflict resolution
Questionable community property rights
Complexity of TFCA initiatives
Lack of international law implementation regarding local community participation
in TFCA initiatives

While arguments for local community involvement in TFCA initiatives are important
and relevant, current evidence suggests that the reality may fall short of the rhetoric and
promise decreed by framers of TFCA initiatives (Linde et al. 2001, Sandwith 2001, Singh
1999, Weis and Draper 2002, and Westing 1998). Compounding the difficulty in enabling
local communities to realize the benefits associated with TFCA initiatives, solutions for
community participation might be as complex as the problems themselves (Metcalfe 1999).
For instance, a fundamental challenge facing local communities is that nation-states may
choose to ignore the mandate of international law to encourage community involvement in
TFCA initiatives. Such a challenge exacerbates problems surrounding protection of
sovereignty, state accountability, and the power of international law.

Transfrontier Conservation Areas, Local Communities, and International Law
Transfrontier conservation areas of southern Africa present land managers,
government officials, and local communities with unique challenges, particularly within
the realm of international law. While domestic protected areas are governed by the laws
and regulations of one nation-state, TFCAs are governed by multiple nation-states. The
multilateral nature of TFCA initiatives challenges fundamental principles of international
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law such as nation-state sovereignty, nation-state responsibility, and good neighborliness
(Singh 1999).
One aspect of good neighborliness is the mutual observance of treaties by
participating nation-states. Observance of treaties is important to local communities
because virtually all nation-states in southern Africa are mandated by international law,
vis-a-vis the Treaty of SADC, to actively involve local communities in TFCA initiatives
(Metcalfe 1999 and Mohammed-Katerere 2001). However, in some &ses, nation-states
have either chosen to not implement or have simply failed to recognize the mandate. The
Kgalagadi Transffontier Park has been well documented for its lack of involvement and
consultation with local San communities (Mayoral-Phillips 2002). Conversely, nation
states may implement the mandate of community involvement, but the involvement may
not be to the extent to which international law mandates. In either case, communities are
marginalized when nation-states fail to recognize the binding responsibilities outlined in
international law (Metcalfe 1999). An assessment of the interface between international
law, local communities, and TFCAs is needed to insure current concerns are addressed
and to serve as a guide for future regional policy related to TFCAs.

The Foundation o f International Law
International law is the body of rules that nation-states consider to be binding in
their mutual relations (Slomanson 2003). It is a construct of norms, standards, principles,
institutions, and procedures of a “society” that is composed not of individual human
beings, but of sovereign nation-states (Henkin 1989). On account of the sovereignty of
nation-states, the observance of international law is dependent on the consent of nation
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states and is a law of coordination rather than subordination. Absent state consent then, a
supposed rule of international law is not binding to that particular state. In essence,
international law is a “voluntary” legal system where the governed govern in order to
preserve the integrity of their respective sovereignties (Slomanson 2003).
The sources of international law have been heavily debated; nevertheless, the
international community has agreed to the following list of sources for establishing the
o

corpus of international law . According to Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice9:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nation-states;
d. ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nation-states, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.

Scholars have interpreted this list as implying six major sources of international law: (1)
treaties, (2) custom, (3) general principles, (4) judicial decisions, (5) scholarly writings,
and (6) UN resolutions. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the ordered listing of
these sources reflects a hierarchy among sources, treaties and customs being the most
important sources, while scholarly writings and UN resolutions are of least importance

8 While the completeness o f this list has been debated (see, e.g., Brownlie 1998; Brierly 1976), the U N Secretary General
heralded this list as a building block o f international law, which has been considered definitive by various international
arbitral tribunals (UN 1949).
9 The International Court o f Justice is the U N ’s judicial branch.
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(Brownlie 1998; Slomanson 2003). Of particular importance to TFCAs in southern
Africa are the first three.

Treaties
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declared that a treaty is
"an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation.”10
Treaties are fundamentally the most convenient and effective way of securing
and identifying international law (Brownlie 1998). They serve as direct proof of the
rights and responsibilities that parties to the treaty have accepted and are the
fundamental source of international law (Bodansky 1995).
Treaties can be classified in a number of different ways. First, they are either
oral or written; while most treaties are written, oral treaties can be just as binding (see,
e.g., Denmark v. Norway 1933). Secondly, they can be classified as unilateral, bilateral,
or multilateral. Unilateral treaties are agreements where a nation-state imposes
responsibilities on another nation-state without assuming any rights or obligations of its
own (e.g., some treaties that occur as a result of war). Bilateral treaties, on the other
hand, are agreements between two nation-states where mutual rights and obligations are
established. In this instance, both participating nation-states assume responsibility and
accountability for the terms of the treaty. Multilateral treaties are similar in principle to
bilateral treaties, but they involve three or more participating nation-states rather than
two. Next, treaties can be classified as either lawmaking or contractual.
10 Modem international law has also recognized oral agreements as binding treaties (Cassese 2002).
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A lawmaking

treaty creates a new rule of international law designed to replace or modify existing
nation-state practices (Slomanson 2003). For example, the Treaty of SADC asserts
many new practices concerning natural resources in southern Africa, such as a binding
mandate for transboundary cooperation. Contractual treaties merely set forth the terms
of a contract to which participating nation states agree (Brownlie 1998). This might
include import-export taxes and tariffs (e.g. the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade). Finally, a treaty is classified as either self-executing or as a declaration of intent.
Self-executing treaties expressly impose immediate obligations upon a nation-state and
require no further action to impose these obligations (Slomanson 2003). Alternatively
nation-states might enter into a declaration o f intent, which would contain general
principles that require actions by each nation-state’s legislative and/or executive branch
to fully implement the treaty (Slomanson 2003).
A necessary first step in the analysis of a treaty is to differentiate between
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness (Weiss and Jacobson 1999).
Implementation, which occurs after ratification11 by participating nation-states, refers to
the mechanisms by which nation-states enact and incorporate international agreements
into their domestic law (Weiss and Jacobson 1999). Implementation can then be further
analyzed with respect to the method o f implementation and the avenue o f implementation.
The avenue o f implementation refers to the legal mechanisms by which provisions of
international law are implemented. Figure 3 displays the avenues of implementation over
which this study is concerned. They can be described as follows:

11 Ratification is the process by which nation-states consult public opinion, debate the conditions o f the treaty in a domestic
governmental setting, and publidy adopt the provisions o f the treaty. Generally, while states might sign a treaty, it does not
enter into force until it has been ratified.
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•

The International Law/Nation-State Policies/Community-Policies/ Community
Members implementation (solid line) - This avenue of implementation occurs when
international law concerning communities grants authority to the nation-state to
draft policies which, in turn, grants local communities authority to draft policy
which implements the international law in question.

•

The International Law/Nation-State Policies/Community Members implementation
(dashed line) - This avenue of implementation occurs when international law
concerning communities grants authority to the nation state to draft policies that
implement the international law in question.

•

The International Law/Community Members interaction (dotted line) - This avenue
of implementation occurs when International Law is self-implementing.

International Law

^ Community Members

Nation-State Policies

Community Policies'
Fig. 3 - Avenues of Policy Implementation Relevant to this Study

The method o f implementation refers to the means by which objectives of treaties
are implemented. To illustrate, consider the Treaty of SADC’s mandate for community
involvement in TFCA initiatives. The avenue of implementation may involve nation-states
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recognizing the mandate for community involvement and then developing binding
national policies that require collaboration between land managing agencies, such as South
Africa National Parks, and local communities. With respect to the method of
implementation, South Africa National Parks may engage in community-based
conservation projects with local communities and actively promote participation of local
community members in planning and management committees.
Compliance, the second component of treaty analysis, goes beyond
implementation and refers to a nation-states’ adherence to the guidelines and provisions
instituted by a treaty (Weiss 1999). Several factors, which might be economic, socio
cultural, or political in nature, influence a nation-state’s compliance with a treaty
(Flaherty 1999). Weiss and Jacobson (1999) note that nation-states are in different
positions on two dimensions when they enter into an agreement: the intention to comply
and the capacity to comply. It has been widely noted that many developing nation
states, such as those found in southern Africa, intend to comply with treaties, but they
may lack the capacity to comply (e.g., see Clapham 1996 and Cleaver 2001). Nation
states may often not have the capacity to comply due to inadequate resources such as
funding, personnel, or appropriate institutions in place to carry out treaty provisions
(Mastny and French 2002).
Ultimately, the success of a treaty is measured by its effectiveness. Effectiveness
refers to whether or not the objectives of a treaty have been or are being achieved (Weiss
and Jacobson 1999). It is important to note that compliance does not necessarily imply
effectiveness. This may often be the case with respect to community involvement in
TFCA initiatives (Metcalfe 1999). For example, nation-states may implement and
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comply with the provisions of the Treaty of SADC, which require community
involvement in TFCA initiatives, by opening planning and management meetings to
local community members; however, if no one from the local community attends the
meetings, then the Treaty has not been effective in actively engaging community
involvement. Implementation and compliance are merely a means to an end, that end
being treaty effectiveness.

Customary International Law
As Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice suggests,
treaties are only one source of international law. International law can also be found in
custom, general principles, judicial decisions, scholarly writings, and UN resolutions.
Aside from treaties, the primary source of international environmental law is custom
(Victor 1999). According to the standard account, customary international law is the
empirical manifestation of the ways in which states consistently and uniformly behave
{Columbia v. Peru 1950). The challenge of customary international law is to figure out
what constitutes “consistent and uniform behavior among states.” Brownlie (1998) posits
four elements for determining whether or not such a behavior is customary international
law: (1) duration of behavior, (2) substantial uniformity and consistency in behavior
among all affected states, (3) generality of practice, and (4) international consensus
about, and recognition of the particular behavior as binding. For instance, the prevention
of transboundary harm (e.g., transboundary pollution) is considered to be a precautionary
example of customary international law (Mohammed-Katerere 2001).
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Customary international law may also manifest through multilateral treaties. In
general, treaties bind only those nation-states that are parties to the treaty; however, if a
sufficient number of nation-states are parties to a multilateral treaty, then that may serve
as evidence of a “consistent and uniform behavior.” (Carr and Scott 1999). Carr and
Scott (1999) argue that there are three criteria that must be met that would enable a
multilateral treaty to be considered customary law:
1. A sufficient number of nation-states in the international system accept the treaty.
2. A significant number of those states whose interests are substantially affected by
the treaty are parties to the treaty.
3. The treaty does not allow reservations on the part of the treaty (i.e. any provision
that a party to the treaty can treat as not applying to itself can hardly become
customary international law that obligates states which do not have a similar
opportunity to reject).
It is important to note that multilateral treaties manifesting customary
international law are both global and regional in scope (Devine 1994). In the case of
regional multilateral treaties, the first criterion would read “A sufficient number of
nation-states in the regional international system accept the treaty.” Provided the other
two criteria are met, a regional multilateral treaty would manifest customary international
law specific to that particular region. For example, suppose all but one nation-state in
sub-Saharan Africa is a party to a particular agreement; then, provided the above criteria
are met, the non-participating nation-state could be bound by the treaty, despite it not
being a signatory.
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Determining what constitutes customary international law is inherently difficult
due to the imprecise nature of the above conditions (Car and Scott 1999 and Goldsmith
and Posner 1999). How many nation-states are needed to constitute an international
consensus? What makes the practice of a behavior “general”? How long must a behavior
have occurred before it can be considered custom? The rampant ambiguity makes it much
easier for nation-states to ignore customary international law. As Bodansky (1995)
argues, the principal importance of customary international law rests not in its ability to
legally resolve disputes, but to set the terms of international discussions and serve as a
framework for negotiations and treaties.

Regionalism in southern Africa
Regionalism refers to the consenting regional organization of nation-states where
the primary objective of such organization is to foster nation-state integration and
cooperation (Robson 1993). Integration, whether social, political, or economic in nature,
is solidified by nation-states signing and ratifying treaties that contain provisions
promoting integration. The European Union is a an example of regionalism where
European nation-states have agreed to integrate economically by accepting a uniform
currency, the Euro, and to integrate politically by conferring and cooperating with one
another to create a uniform political voice in international matters (e.g., the international
opinion of the European Union in response to the United States-Iraq conflicts of the early
21st century). Like Europe, southern Africa is no stranger to regionalism. The Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC are modem attempts at regionalism where
nation-states integrate politically, socially, and economically. The regionalism efforts of
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SADC are especially relevant to TFCA initiatives and serve as an example of southern
Africa’s attempt to regionalize and integrate in an environmental context.
While many consider regionalism in southern Africa to be a noble goal, it is not
without challenges (e.g., see Tlou 1997 and Gibb 1997). Challenges to regionalism can
include discordant cultures of participating nation-states, which might lead to an inability
to communicate effectively and understand the circumstances surrounding other
participating nation-states’ positions on particular matters. Challenges might also include
dissonant long-term goals, which could result in conflicting perceptions of direction of
the organization.
Inequity among participating nation-states, which can be economic or political in
nature, is also a limiting factor to the success of regionalism. This is of particular
importance to nation-states in southern Africa. For example, the South African
component of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park - Kruger National Park - is one of
the most popular protected areas in the world and is visited by a considerably larger
number of tourists than the parks of Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Duffy 1997). The
result is that South Africa reaps a larger share of the economic benefits associated with
the TFCA than Mozambique or Zimbabwe (Fakir 2001). Other examples of regional
inequity are pandemic, but it is this challenge that provides the greatest threat to
successful regionalism in southern Africa (Tlou 1997).

The Treaty o f SADC and the Mandate to Involve Local Communities in TFCA Initiatives
The Southern African Development Community is a culmination of regionalism
movements that called for solidarity and independence for peoples of African descent
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(Padmore 1949 and Clapham 1996). The underlying premise of the movements was that
unity would insure real independence from colonial and neo-colonial forces in Africa
(Omer-Cooper 1994 and Clapham 1996). The Southern African Development Community
has formally stated that “[its] ultimate objective is to build a region in which there will be a
high degree of harmonization and rationalization to enable the pooling of resources to
achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the
region” (SADC 2003).
The provisions of the Treaty are carried out through various protocols and policies
drafted by SADC, which are then signed and ratified by the Member States. The protocols
and policies of SADC reflect the general concerns shared by the Member States and offer
more specific direction and guidelines for cooperation than what is set forth in the Treaty.
For instance, there are policies and protocols addressing tourism, energy, trade, drug
trafficking, and wildlife conservation. The importance of the protocols is addressed in
Article 22 of the Treaty: “each protocol shall be approved by [the Heads of State or
Government] and shall thereafter become an integral part of this Treaty” [emphasis added].
A recurring theme in SADC protocols and policies is that SADC is particularly interested
in accomplishing its objectives while fostering community participation in the process. In
fact, not only is the participation of communities encouraged, but, in many cases, it is
mandated.
Article 5 sections 1(g) and 2(b) of the Treaty form the foundation for the mandate
to encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives: “the sustainable utilization of
natural resources and effective protection of the environment” is an objective of SADC
which, in addition to other means, shall be achieved by “encourag[ing] the people of the
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Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social, and cultural ties
across the Region, and to participate fully in the implementation o f the programmes and
projects o f SADC’ [emphasis added]. According to Article 4(f) of the Protocol on Wildlife
Conservation and Law Enforcement, a specific objective of the protocol is to “promote the
conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment of transfrontier
conservation areas” [emphasis added]. Thus, TFCA initiatives are to be considered a
legitimate program or project of SADC, and, hence, the people of the region (i.e., local
communities) and their institutions are to participate fully in the implementation of TFCA
initiatives.
The failure of nation-states to recognize this mandate is not without consequence.
Article 6 sections 4 and 5 suggest that Member States are to accord this Treaty as having
the force of not only international law, but of national law, as well. Furthermore, Article
33 of the Treaty states that sanctions may be imposed against nation-states who fail to
recognize this and repeatedly fail to meet the objectives and obligations assumed under the
Treaty.
While Member States might sign a treaty, it does not imply that they will comply
with, implement, or achieve its objectives. International law is fraught with examples of
treaties that are routinely ignored by participating nation-states. The Treaty of SADC has
proven to be such an example for a number of reasons. First, while the Treaty is strong in
developmental integration, it is weak in the area of economic integration, which has led to a
general expression of apathy towards the Treaty by many members of SADC (Clapham
1996, Holland 1995, and Tlou 1997). As with the European Union, economic integration
truly solidifies regionalism and is a necessary condition to insure the uniform recognition
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and acceptance of the Treaty as a whole (Holland 1995). Secondly, many Member States
simply do not have the resources (financial or human) to carry out the objectives of the
Treaty (Boyle 2001, Cummings 2001, and Mohammed-Katerere 2001). Non
governmental organizations such as the World Bank and World Wildlife Fund have
contributed substantially to the start-up costs of SADC sanctioned projects and programs,
but the long-term financial support needed to maintain them is unstable at best (Fakir 2001
and Weis and Draper 2002). Thirdly, when South Africa joined SADC in 1994, following
the fall of apartheid, the balance of power shifted tremendously toward the newly
democratized state (Worden 2000). South Africa’s status makes it somewhat difficult for
the Community to engage in intensely conflictual debates with the region’s economic
hegemon (Tlou 1997). Finally, Member States must address issues surrounding
sovereignty and equity. By doing so, the remaining challenges could be abated to a certain
extent (Clapham 1996). Economic integration, for instance, cannot truly exist until nation
states become secure in their sovereignty and yield to cooperation in the areas of trade and
standardization of economic practices (Page 1999). Member States must be viewed as
equal partners in integration despite the economic superiority of some nation-states (e.g.
South Africa) over others (e.g. Namibia). While SADC certainly faces formidable
challenges concerning the implementation of its objectives, it remains the most successful
regional program in southern Africa (Tlou 1997) and carries the force, responsibility, and
accountability associated with international law.
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The African Union
While SADC might currently be the most successful attempt at regionalism in
southern Africa, some have heralded the African Union (AU) as the true mechanism to
bring about an “African Renaissance” (Schoeman 2002). The African Union, established
in 2002, grew from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 to unite
the nation-states of Africa against colonial subjugation and racism and promote
cooperation that would improve the lives of African people (OAU 1963). By its fiftieth
anniversary, OAU had virtually accomplished its goal of eradicating colonization in
Africa. Nevertheless, the organization was seen as having failed to respond to serious
intra-African conflicts and economic crises plaguing much of the continent (Packer and
Rukare 2002).

Recognizing that the contemporary challenges facing Africa could not

be addressed by OAU, the AU was formed to economically integrate Africa through a
common market and to provide the continent with a unified voice in international matters
(Udombana 2002). Draft protocols have been circulated outlining the establishment of a
Pan-African Parliament, a African Court of Justice, and three financial institutions
(consisting of the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African
Investment Bank) (Packer and Rukare 2002). At present, though, the AU resembles little
more than an empty shell whose organs and institutions must be further specified and
defined. This is to be done through protocols that, in most cases, have not been drafted,
let alone adopted. The diversity of nation-states in Africa and the weak African economy
provide critical challenges to the effectiveness of the AU, but the organization provides
guidance as to how Africa envisages its future (Schoeman 2002).
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Considering the AU’s potential as a highly influential international organization,
policies related to community participation in conservation efforts, such as TFCA
initiatives, will be pivotal. The African Union is still young and has yet to formulate
definitive policies related to community involvement in conservation efforts. However,
given the growing importance of TFCA initiatives in southern Africa, such policies are
inevitable. Lessons learned from SADC and its policies toward community involvement
in TFCA initiatives could prove to be invaluable to the framers of an AU policy.

Indigenous Peoples in International Law
One of the shared norms driving regionalism in southern Africa is the protection
of indigenous peoples’ and communities’ rights. Historically, states have been the only
entities directly affected by international law. In the past few decades, though, the scope
of international law has broadened to include the consideration of indigenous peoples’
rights. The foundation for the recognition of human rights in international law can be
found in the United Nation-states Charter, adopted on June 26,1945, which established
among the organization’s purpose the promotion of “equal rights and self-determination
of peoples.”

i *y

The promulgation of this objective marked a distinct shift from the

European-centered international law that fostered colonialism and considered it to be a
mechanism by which indigenous peoples were protected (Anaya 2000). While there was
a shift in certain objectives of international law, many years followed before the
objectives were effectuated in southern Africa. For instance, the apartheid regime of
South Africa remained in power until nearly 50 years after the adoption of the UN

12 Self-determination is identified as a universe o f human rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples, including indigenous
peoples, and grounded in the idea that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies (Scott 1996).
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Charter. As illustrated by the fall of the apartheid regime, the contemporary treatment of
indigenous peoples and communities has been substantially driven by indigenous peoples
themselves (Peang-Meth 2002).
The past few decades has produced numerous conventions and international
agreements that seek to recognize the legitimacy of indigenous peoples’ and
communities’ rights and to redress injustices incurred by colonization. Some of the more
prominent conventions and agreements include the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (1981), the United Nation-states Conference on Environmental
Development (1992), the Rio Declaration and the more detailed environmental policy
statement known as Agenda 21 (1992), the Treaty of SADC (1992), and the Draft United
Nation-states Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993) (for a more detailed
treatment of conventions and agreements regarding indigenous peoples’ rights, see Anaya
2000). All of the above conventions and agreements acknowledge a moral and legal
obligation to insure the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, which
includes their participation and consultation in matters directly affecting them. Given the
broad acceptance of such principles, self-determination is widely acknowledged as a
principle of customary international law (Anaya 2000, Perret 1998, and Slomanson
2003). Notwithstanding its status as law, self-determination of indigenous peoples is
often not observed by nation-states in the absence of a binding treaty (Peang-Meth 2002
and Scott 1996). This amplifies the importance of including provisions in treaties that
acknowledge the self-determination of indigenous peoples and their communities.
Considering southern Africa’s history of colonization and marginalization, nation-states
in the region have intransigently incorporated the principle of self-determination into
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many regional treaties concerning the environment and development, the Treaty of
SADC being one such example.

The Framework o f Self-Determination
Rights afforded to indigenous peoples and their communities, including those
found in the Treaty of SADC, are typically done so under a framework of selfdetermination. Self-determination “entails a universe of human rights precepts extending
from core values of freedom and equality and applying in favor of human beings in
relation to the institutions of government under which they live.” (Anaya 2000). As a
corollary, the self-determination framework further acknowledges that indigenous
peoples are entitled to control their own destinies and participate in projects, programs,
and initiatives which might directly and indirectly affect them (Scott 1996). This
normative framework is widely recognized as being within the corpus of customary
international law and has been incorporated into numerous treaties, conventions, and
agreements.
The self-determination framework consists of two normative strains: the
constitutive aspect and the ongoing aspect. The constitutive aspect requires that the
creation of the governing institutional body be substantially guided by the will of the
people, or peoples, governed. The ongoing aspect requires that the governing
institutional body be one under which people may live and develop freely on a
continuous basis. (Anaya 2000, Kingsbury 1998, Lynch 1996, Peang-Meth 2002, Perret
1998, and Scott 1996)
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When institutions are bom or merged with others, when their constitutions are
altered, or when they endeavor to extend the scope of their authority, they are within the
sphere of constitutive self-determination (Anaya 2000). Constitutive self-determination
does not dictate the outcome of such phenomena; rather, it imposes requirements of
participation, consultation, and consent of indigenous peoples. The violation of this
principle lead to the international illegitimacy of colonization, which represented
impermissible territorial expansion of governmental authorities (due to a lack of
indigenous consent) (Peang-Meth 2002). In the context of TFCAs of southern Africa,
constitutive self-determination mandates the involvement and consent of local
communities in the establishment and institution of TFCAs.
Ongoing self-determination continually enjoins the governing institutional body
to maintain a dialogue with indigenous communities (Perret 1998). In essence, it requires
a governing body to make thoughtful and meaningful choices in all matters concerned
with indigenous peoples and their communities (Anaya 2000 and Kingsbury 1998).
Furthermore, this necessarily requires continual participation, consultation and consent in
decision-making processes with which indigenous peoples are concerned (Lynch 1996).
As identified in the UN Friendly Relations Declaration (1970), indigenous peoples are to
“freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
Functioning self-determination requires at least five minimum conditions (Anaya
2000, Mohammed-Katerere 2001, and Scott 1996):
•

Nondiscrimination - the UN Charter provides for “respect of human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.”
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•

Respect for cultural integrity - indigenous peoples reserve the right to maintain
and freely develop their cultural identity in coexistence with other sectors of
humanity.

•

Recognition of land and natural resource rights - according to the International
Labour Organization Convention Number 169, “governments shall respect the
special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned
of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they
occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this
relationship.” The convention adds that indigenous peoples “shall not be removed
from the lands which they occupy” unless under prescribed conditions where
necessary as an “exceptional measure.”

•

The right to social welfare and development - the UN Charter promulgates that
governments shall promote economic and social progress and development
among indigenous peoples.

•

Self government - as the overarching political dimension of ongoing selfdetermination, self-government consists of the idea that government is to function
according to the will of the people governed.

These normative precepts are necessary conditions to insure the self-determination of
indigenous peoples and provide indicators as to the health of functioning systems of selfdetermination (Anaya 2000, Kingsbury 1998, and Peang-Meth 2002).
International agreements in southern Africa, such as the Treaty of SADC and the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, have taken great strides to insure that constitutive
and ongoing self-determination are recognized as objectives of the agreements.
However, for a number of reasons, the objectives may not be complied with,
implemented, or effectuated, creating feelings of distrust and cynicism, toward the
nation-state, among indigenous communities. Transfrontier conservation area initiatives
of southern Africa provide an excellent venue through which the interface of international
law and local indigenous communities can be assessed, under the framework of selfdetermination. Through this assessment, emerging attempts at regionalism, such as the
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AU, might recognize the legal obligation to facilitate self-determination of indigenous
communities in TFCA initiatives and endeavor to promote it as an objective of regional
integration.

Research Objectives
Despite the widely shared norms and beliefs, such as self-determination outlined
above, there has been a relatively small amount of research dedicated to investigating the
disconnect between codifying these values into law and then implementing the law. This
is particularly true in the case of TFCAs in southern Africa where, according to the
Treaty of SADC, nation-states are mandated to encourage community involvement in
TFCA initiatives. Prior to this research, studies had not been conducted to assess whether
or not nation-states actually view this provision as a mandate of international law.
Furthermore, in the context of the existing literature, the motivations for nation-states’
formalization (or lack thereof) of international law and agreements related to TFCAs is
not clear. These apparent gaps in research shaped the four fundamental objectives of this
study:
1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements);
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement formalization
desirable or undesirable.
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Transfrontier conservation areas will continue to be an important venue for
bioregionalism and conservation initiatives throughout southern Africa and the world.
Given their importance, it’s imperative to understand the mechanisms by which
management decisions and policy are made. International law is an important component
of this understanding since, as international entities, TFCA policy are or could be
significantly shaped by agreements between participating nation-states. The following
chapter illustrates how the four objectives listed above were operationalized to
adequately investigate TFCAs, international law, and their implications for community
involvement within southern Africa.
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Chapter

3

METHODS OF STUDY

This investigation assessed the complex interface between international law,
TFCAs, and local communities in two settings: Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) and
the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area (MDTCDA).
Each study site was chosen on the basis of four principles:
1. Length of establishment
2. Objectives and purpose of the TFCA
3. Political stability of participating nation-states
4. Availability of data and sources of information.
These TFCAs were chosen based on their differences in the first two principles listed
above, thus providing a more thorough examination. The fulfillment of the last two
insured safety in gathering data and the thoroughness of the research.
The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, while
MDTCDA was established in 2001. The objectives and purposes of KTP are geared
towards protection of the land and resources, whereas the objectives and purposes of
MDTCDA promote agriculture, settlement, and development in addition to land and
resource protection. Differences such as these were designed to provide keen insight into
how adherence to international law may be affected by variables such as length of
establishment and the objectives and purposes of TFCAs. In the interest of safety,
political stability was also considered in the selection process. For example, due to the
political instability of Zimbabwe and the impending danger of entering the country, the
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Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was not selected as a study site. South Africa,
Botswana, and Lesotho are all relatively stable and provided a safe environment for
research. Finally, KTP and MDTCDA were selected partially on the basis that the
University of Montana has well-established relationships with individuals involved in
both TFCAs. These relationships promoted a richer study of the issue and helped foster
relationships with other contacts.

The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park
Situated in the sparsely populated Kalahari Desert of southwest Botswana and
north-central South Africa, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (see Fig. 4) is composed of
South Africa’s Kalahari-Gemsbok National Park (9,591 km ) and Botswana’s Gemsbok
9

#

National Park (28,400 km ). The Park is a harsh environment that is home to species of
plants that must withstand up to ten months of drought. Despite the arid conditions,
wildlife flourishes in the area. Antelope such as the eland, gemsbok, hartebeest,
steenbok, and duiker all manage well without a large quantity of water. Large game
animals such as lion, hyena, and jackals also call this Park home. However, wildlife
often roam far distances in search of food and water. Inevitably, this has frequently
required wildlife to roam across the South African and Botswanan borders. Recognizing
this, land management agencies from South Africa and Botswana acknowledged the need
to collaborate in management and work cooperatively to ensure that the Kalahari Desert
and its natural resources were adequately protected.
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Figure 4 - The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park

In 1948, the governments of Botswana and South Africa informally agreed to
collaborate in the management of the two parks. The two parks functioned as a single
ecological unit where wildlife was allowed to move between the parks without the
impediment of fences. This agreement was formalized 51 years later in 1999 when South
Africa and Botswana signed a bilateral agreement establishing the Transfrontier Park.
Since its formalization, various activities have been undertaken to help insure the
successful consolidation of the two parks. These activities are outlined in the joint
management plan and include research, management, communication, tourism
management and development, problem-animal control, and infrastructure development
(PPF 2003).
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While several diverse cooperative projects are underway, most are centered on the
protection and conservation of the land and natural resources. According to its
management plan, KTP is to be managed in accordance with five principle objectives:
1. To preserve the diversity of organisms indigenous to the southern Kalahari as
functional elements of the ecosystem, with predators receiving priority.
2. To maintain in particular the ecological processes that characterize the Kalahari
ecosystem.
3. To provide facilities and opportunities for research and monitoring to further
understanding of the physical and biological processes of the Kalahari ecosystem.
4. To mitigate the less desirable impacts of existing and potential land-use conflicts
between the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and neighboring communities.
5. To realize economic returns from tourism associated with the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park, while safeguarding its ecological integrity and pristine
wilderness quality.
(SANP and BDWNP 1997)

While the management plan contains provisions aimed at ensuring that local
communities will benefit economically, community development and participation in
Park decisions are not specifically cited as an objective. However, on the South Africa
side, a recent successful land claim by the indigenous San people has insured that local
communities will play a vital role in the future of the park. Unfortunately, the
establishment of national parks in southern Africa was, historically, not always done with
the intention of protecting and conserving land and natural resources. Rather, parks were
often established to legitimize the taking of land by colonists from indigenous peoples
(Omer-Cooper 1997; Shillington 1993). In 1931, shortly after the establishment of the
Kalahari-Gemsbok, the Khomani San were evicted from the land they occupied within
the park and were dispersed across other parts of South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia
After the fall of apartheid in 1994, a new South Africa constitution was written, which
allowed (and even encouraged) indigenous peoples who were removed from their land by
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colonists to reclaim their land. Accordingly, the Khomani San filed a claim, which was
awarded in 2002, entitling them to roughly 650 km of the Kalahari-Gemsbok National
Park and extensive land-use rights in KTP (Chennells 2002).
The most formidable challenges that KTP faces involve its interactions with local
communities, such as the Khomani San, and their role in the management and planning of
the Park (PPF 2003). While the management plan does not directly address development
or community participation, communities have been afforded land-use rights, including
participation in park decisions and development through other means such as land-claims.
Additionally, as illustrated in the previous chapter, local communities are also afforded
participatory rights vis-a-vis the Treaty of SADC. Nevertheless, the role of local
communities in KTP is not clearly defined, thus magnifying the need for an assessment
of the role they currently and could potentially have.

The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area
The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area
provides a scenario in stark contrast with KTP. The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Area is roughly 5,000 km in size (approximately 13% of
KTP’s size) and is situated in the Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains of South Africa and
Lesotho. While KTP is composed of two national parks, MDTCDA is composed of four
national parks, several nature reserves, and a variety of privately protected areas. Also
found within the border of MDTCDA are numerous areas slated for development.
The Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains are known for their snowfalls, clear streams,
and invaluable wetland and riparian areas that provide a significant portion of Lesotho’s
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and South Africa’s water and hydroelectric power. Many of the ecosystems found within
MDTCDA are unique to the area. The “Roof of Africa,” as it has come to be called, is
also a World Heritage Site and a proposed Biosphere Reserve. In recognition of the
unique qualities and characteristics of MDTCDA, the governments of South Africa and
Lesotho signed a MOU on June 11,2001 promulgating a framework for cooperation
between the two countries. The objectives of the project are to (World Bank/GEF 2000):
1. conserve the globally significant biodiversity of the Maloti-Drakensberg
mountains;
2. contribute to community development through income-generation from naturebased tourism.

The proposed cooperation between the two countries exists in several areas
including managing ecological threats, community involvement, conservation planning,
protected area planning, protected area management, tourism planning, and strengthening
institutions (Ezemvelo Kwa-Zulu-Natal Wildlife 2001). While many of these areas are
similar to those of KTP, on the surface, community involvement appears to play a more
critical and important role in MDTCDA. Communities and conservation staff will jointly
identify challenges and opportunities with the support of a team of social scientists and
community extension workers (Sandwith 2003). Additionally, progress has been made in
South Africa with the appointment of statutory boards for protected areas (Sandwith
2000). These boards represent sectoral and community interest in nature conservation
and are appointed through a public nomination process. Vested in the board is the power
to influence management of protected areas nation-wide (including MDTCDA) and to
allocate funds that accrue to a community trust from levies imposed on visitors to the
protected areas. All of these actions and plans could potentially make MDTCDA a
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progressive example of community involvement in TFCA initiatives. The forward
thought is best summarized in the MOU: “Peace, economic development, and
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.”
Despite the emphasis on community involvement and empowerment, MDTCDA
faces challenges with respect to local communities. In Lesotho, virtually no investment
in eco-tourism has been made and there exists critical deficiencies in infrastructure.
Without proper sharing systems in place, this might lead to inequitable distribution of
benefits. It is also recognized by the framers of MDTCDA that the local communities are
often isolated politically and marginalized in terms of infrastructure development. This
has, in the past, led to weak government interaction and a general distrust for outside
political entities. Through the initiative, MDTCDA planners hope to strengthen these
relationships by involving local communities, especially those marginalized in the past, at
the fundamental level of decision-making.
The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area
provides a much different approach to community involvement than KTP. However,
they both face similar fundamental challenges - gaining the trust of local communities
and efficiently involving them in the decision-making process while, at the same time,
empowering them economically, politically, and socially.

Population Sampled
In order to adequately assess TFCAs and the role of local communities in the
context of international law, information was gathered from four principle populations:
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national government officials, community officials (including land managers),
academicians, and NGO officials.
The national government officials relevant to this study included the Ministers of
Environment (or tourism) for South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho and officials from
agencies such as South Africa National Parks and Botswana Department of Wildlife and
National Parks. Data were gathered from the Ministers to shed light on macro-level
aspects of TFCAs, local communities, and international law. For example, the Ministers
(or their staff) were best equipped to answer questions concerning who chooses to
recognize SADC’s mandates and why they may not recognize it. They also were able to
provide insight into the institutions or resources that might be helpful in ensuring the
effectiveness of the mandate. Officials from land management agencies provided data
based on first hand experience with communities. These agencies have and are engaging
in active community participation and are well aware of the methods of implementation
of the mandate and the necessary conditions for cooperative management to take place.
Academics and NGO officials provided an external voice to the data. While national
government officials and local community officials might consciously or subconsciously
express inherent biases, academicians and NGO officials were able to shed light on the
contextual nuances surrounding TFCAs and local communities from an “observer
perspective.”

Data Sampling
Due to the relative newness of TFCAs in southern Africa, not all national
government officials were familiar with TFCAs and their implications for local
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communities. When a researcher is studying a population whose members may not all be
I -i

suitable informants , or they are difficult to locate, Bernard (2002) argues that the best
means of sampling is snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is the location of one or
more key informants who will, in turn, provide the researcher with the names of other
likely informants. The research of Richardson (1988), Kadushin (1968), and Ostrander
(1980) are all classic examples of studies conducted using snowball sampling in
situations similar to that used for research on TFCAs and communities in the context of
international law.
Snowball sampling is also helpful in situations where informants know all of the
other informants in a population. In general, this is the case in southern Africa, where
national government officials that are familiar with TFCA initiatives are familiar with
one another. However, community officials and leaders are not always able to provide
the names of other community officials and leaders who were participating or interested
in TFCA co-management. In this case, knowledgeable national government officials and
academicians were able to provide the names of valuable community officials and
leaders.
Snowball sampling is a popular means of sampling, particularly in anthropology
and sociology (Bernard 2002); however, it is not without its pitfalls. If one is dealing
with a relatively small population of people who are likely to be in contact with one
another, then snowball sampling can be effective. In a large population, though, people
who are well known tend to be on everyone’s list while lesser known, but still important,
informants are less likely to be mentioned. In larger populations, then, snowball

13 An informant is defined as a member o f the studied population who is capable o f providing the researcher with meaningful
data.
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sampling is risky since every person does not have the same chance of being included
(Bernard 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Given the relatively small population being
sampled and the sophisticated networking of key informants, this challenge was not a
problem.

Data Collection Techniques
Aside from the analysis of management plans, treaties, and other agreements, the
primary source of data for this study was tape-recorded interviews. Interviews were
semi-structured and based on the use of a formalized interview guide. The utility of
semi-structured interviews is that they maintain a level of formality that promotes
efficient use of time and collection of relevant data while allowing the interviewee to
express tangential or corollary thoughts that might also be relevant (Bernard 2002).
Semi-structured interviewing is the most popular method of interviewing among
anthropologists and sociologists when the researcher has the opportunity to query the
interviewee in-person (Glaser and Strauss 1999). Due to the efficient use of time, it also
works very well in projects where the researcher is interviewing high-level bureaucrats,
in which case it is often difficult to schedule interviews and scheduled interviews are
often, by necessity, brief (Bernard 2002). The conditions of this research made semi
structured interviews the data collection method of choice.
The questions posed during the interview were based on an interview guide that
centered around the four fundamental objectives of this study:
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1. To determine the legal and cooperative structure for TFCAs within southern
Africa (e.g., informal vs. formal agreements);
2. To assess whether or not the relevant treaties and agreements are viewed by
participating nation-states as a mandate of international law (e.g., do nation-states
view the Treaty of SADC as a mandate to encourage community involvement?);
3. To ascertain why these treaties and agreements might not be viewed as a
mandate;
4. and, to determine what circumstances would make treaty/agreement
formalization desirable or undesirable.

Depending on the professional position, familiarity with relevant issues, and
language proficiency of the respondent being interviewed, the questions below required
occasional modification or re-phrasing. Nevertheless, the integrity and intent of the
questions were maintained despite this occasional modification. The interview guide was
comprised of the following nine questions:
1. How much of the current community involvement in TFCA initiatives can be
attributed to conscious efforts to implement SADC’s provisions? That is, how
much of the current community involvement was pre-existing or a result of nonintemational law forces?
2. Are agreements governing TFCAs formal or informal? What are the advantages
and disadvantages of each type?
3. Are adequate systems of accountability established through the agreements?
4. Do nation-states and local communities view SADC’s provisions as a mandate to
encourage community involvement in TFCA initiatives?
5. Who chooses to recognize (or not to recognize) and/or implement SADC’s
provisions (e.g., nation-states, national government agencies, or local
communities)?
6. Why may nation-states choose to not recognize and/or implement SADC’s
provisions?
7. What institutions or resources are missing which would allow SADC’s provisions
to be effectuated?
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8. What role do nation-states want SADC to play with respect to TFCAs in southern
Africa?
9. Given the rising popularity of the African Union (AU), if AU desired to establish
similar objectives of community involvement in TFCA initiatives, how might
AU’s methods be different than SADC’s in effectuating those objectives?

This guide was thorough enough to adequately assess TFCAs and the role of the
community in international law while being brief enough to not inconvenience the
interviewee.

Data Analyses Used
One of the most effective means of analyzing interviews is through “groundedtheory.” The grounded-theory approach, championed by Glaser and Strauss in the late
1960s, is a set of techniques for (1) identifying categories and concepts that emerge from
the data, and (2) recognizing relationships between concepts and formulating those
relationships into substantive and formal theories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Russell
2002). Grounded-theory differs from other methods of text analysis, such as content
analysis, in that it allows hypotheses and theories to emerge rather than only testing a
priori assumptions. The use of grounded-theory is especially important in studying
issues that have not been previously studied, as is the case with the proposed research.
Using content analysis for nascent fields of research fundamentally constrains the theory
and, often, the a priori assumptions are speculative at best (Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Strauss and Corbin 1998). This is not to say that, with grounded theory, fundamental
questions and assumptions are not postulated beforehand. Fundamental questions and
assumptions are offered beforehand to serve as a guiding framework that sets the bounds
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for the research. Without this framework, the researcher runs the risk of generalized and
meaningless data. In essence, the value of grounded-theory is that it allows the
researcher to test fundamental hypotheses while still permitting unforeseen theory to
emerge.
The first component of the grounded-theory method is identifying categories and
concepts that emerge from the text. The principle behind this identification is
discovering patterns of behavior or thought in a set of texts. This usually begins with
simply reading the texts and underlining or highlighting dominant ideas or themes as one
goes along. The varieties of ideas or themes that are identified are termed categories.
These categories are then briefly named. Bernard (1974) discusses his method for
naming categories or emergent ideas:
“In my study of how ocean scientists interact with people in
Washington D.C., who are responsible for ocean policy, I kept hearing
the word ‘brokers.’ Scientists and policy makers alike used this word to
describe people whom they trusted to act as go-betweens, so ‘broker’
became one of the [category names] for my work.”

As the researcher analyzes the texts, inherent properties of the categories will
emerge. Properties refer to the describing elements of the categories (Glaser and Strauss
1967). For example, “brokers’ relationship with ocean scientists” and “brokers’ concern
for the pursuit of oceanic research” might be two properties of the “broker” category
described above. The establishment of categories and properties allows the researcher to
develop concepts about the category. Concepts are the conclusions that can be reached
given a category and its properties (Corbin and Strauss 1998). The critical component
of grounded-theory is recognizing the relationships among the different concepts and
formulating theories from those relationships. In the broker example above, a concept
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may be that “brokers” are “concerned with the pursuit of oceanic research” and they
actively maintain strong working “relationships with ocean scientists.”
Shaping the concepts into substantive and formal theories is the second and final
component of the grounded-theory method. Substantive and formal theories differ only
in the degree of generality, but each requires a unique analytic approach. Substantive
theory is concerned with specific, or empirical, areas of inquiry, whereas formal theory
is derived from generalizations from classes of substantive theories. The substantive
area o f this research is concerned with the interface between international law and
communities situated in and around KTP and MDTCDA. The formal portion of the
research is the implications of this substantive research to the broad field of international
law. Several substantive areas and cases must be researched before formal theory can be
established (Bernard 2002). The specific nature of this research does not lend itself to
generating formal theory, but it can contribute to its formation.
In summary, the systematic approach to analyzing the data gathered for this
research was as follows:
1. Produce transcripts of interviews and read through the texts.
2. Identify categories and properties that arise.
3. As the categories and properties emerge, formulate concepts and compare them.
4. Think about how the concepts are linked together
5. Use the relations among concepts to build theory, constantly checking the theory
against the data.
6. Present the results using quotes from interviews that illuminate the theory.
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Grounded theory is a clear departure from the traditional deductive approach of
hypothesis testing. The method offers the researcher the unique and creative opportunity to
test fundamental a priori hypotheses and propositions and to generate emergent theory that
might lead to future research. The clear advantage of grounded-theory research is that,
with respect to emergent theory, the theoretical hypotheses are tested through the already
existing data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Therefore, the researcher does not run the risk of
having a weakly supported substantive theory. In general substantive theory “can usually
not be completely refuted by more data or replaced by another theory.” (Glaser and Strauss
1967) Since the method is so intimately “grounded” in the data, the formulated theories are
destined to last, despite inevitable modification.

Evolution of data collection method
The nature of grounded theory requires the interviewer to adapt to and
accommodate emergent categories and concepts. As categories and concepts emerge,
research questions evolve to further explore them. For instance, throughout the course of
this research, the interview guide evolved to investigate the notion of formalization to a
greater extent than was originally planned. While this notion was a fundamental focus
from the beginning of the research, interviewees reinforced it as the principle category.
The importance of formalization was corroborated in that nearly every emergent concept
appeared to be related to the idea of agreement formalization.
Granted, the shift of formalization to a primary focus of the study is a fundamental
one, the substance of the research questions were largely unchanged. The result was, in
effect, that the findings evolved in a different manner than was anticipated. Rather than
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being a question of community involvement, the research came to be an inquisition into the
fundamental driving forces behind a nation-states decision to formalize agreements.
Nevertheless, this paradigm shift substantially informed questions concerning community
involvement in TFCAs in the context of international law.
The next chapter presents a discussion of research findings that illustrates the
importance of agreement formalization and its implications for community involvement in
TFCA initiatives. It also highlights the cooperative and legal structure of TFCAs.
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Chapter

4

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

To better understand transfrontier conservation areas and the role of communities in
the context of international law, three months of field research (June 2003-August 2003)
was conducted in southern Africa that entailed interviews with several individuals from
South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. While challenges were encountered in
the process of collecting these data, the respondents shed valuable insight into nation-state
awareness of international law (including the Treaty of SADC), the desire for agreement
formalization, the Treaty of SADC as a mandate for community involvement in TFCA
initiatives, and the potential role of SADC and the African Union in TFCA initiatives.
The chapter begins with a brief summary of the principle challenges encountered
throughout the course of the field research. Following this summary is a discussion of the
findings, which includes an outline of the concepts, categories, and theories that emerged
from the data. The variability of findings between the study sites are then presented
followed by a summary of key findings and insights.

Challenges encountered

In essence, the significant challenges encountered throughout the collection of data
revolved around the nature of the population itself. For the purposes of this study, the
population was defined as individuals familiar with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park or the
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area who have
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knowledge of both international law and transfrontier conservation areas. The sample set
interviewed was chosen through snowball sampling and consisted of directors and staff of
NGOs, government officials, retired individuals who have played a critical role in the
establishment of TFCAs within the region, and academics.
Throughout the collection of data, three principle population-based challenges
emerged:

•

small population,

•

bias among interviewees, and

•

short fieldwork period, which led to the inability of many busy potential
interviewees to be interviewed.

Small population
Transfrontier conservation is an emerging area of interest; as such, the number of
individuals with expertise in both TFCAs and international law is small. Given that the
population was small, though, the sample included a substantial portion of the population,
as defined above. Notwithstanding a representative data set, the size of the population
prevented saturation of the data itself14.

Bias among interviewees
Of the 16 individuals interviewed, 12 (75%) were from South Africa, 2 (12.5%)
were from Zimbabwe, 1 (6.25%) was from Botswana, and 1 (6.25%) was from Lesotho.
This distribution is largely due to a more developed human resource infrastructure within

14 According to the “grounded theory” methodology illustrated in Chapter 3, the researcher must continue to sample until
the data are “saturated” (i.e., no new or relevant data would likely emerge from further sampling).
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South Africa. The South African government is simply able to employ more individuals in
transfrontier conservation than any other country within sub-Saharan Africa. Thus,
responses are inherently biased towards South African perspectives. Furthermore, South
Africa is a participating nation-state in both study sites. Finally, it is clear from the list of
interviewees that a particular bias exists towards males with power.

Shortfieldwork period
The population sampled included high-level government officials, NGO directors
and employees, and academics - all of whom were extremely busy and had virtually
inflexible schedules. While only one interviewee cancelled an appointment, there were
four potential interviewees (2 from South Africa, 1 from Lesotho, and 1 from Botswana)
who were unable to meet during the three-month period of fieldwork.

While there were challenges encountered, they were of an unavoidable nature. The
integrity of the research, however, was largely maintained and provided an atmosphere
conducive for emergent categories, concepts, and theories that served to clarify the research
questions and facilitate the realization of the four objectives of this research. In short,
while there were challenges in collecting the data, none were significant enough to warrant
the data irrelevant or inapplicable; the results must simply be considered subject to the
constraint of these challenges.

Emergent categories, concepts, and theories
Throughout the course of the research, a number of categories and concepts
emerged which led to substantive theory concerning the relationship between international
law and TFCAS as well as the implications of this relationship for community involvement
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in TFCA initiatives. Below is a table delineating the categories, concepts, and theory that
emerged throughout the course of analysis.

Categories
International law and
institutional accountability

•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

Formalization

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

The Treaty of SADC as a
mandate

Concepts
Sanctions
Donors
Institutional structures
Progress reporting
Delegation of
responsibility

Formalization may not
always be necessary or
desired.
Funding
Pre-existing cross-border
management
Significant vs.
insignificant
management actions
Parties with a vested
interest
Number of parties
involved
Diversity of views
Political will
Capacity
Necessity

Theories
International accountability is
achieved principally through
three different mechanisms:
sanctions, institutional structures,
and donors
Accountability is established
through progress reporting that
takes place between institutional
structures and delegation of
responsibility through these
channels.
Formalization of TFCA
agreements might not always be
necessary or desired.
The necessity of TFCA
agreement formalization is based
on:
1. Donor funding
2. Pre-existing crossborder management.
3. The significance of
management actions.
4. The types of parties
involved.
5. The number of parties
involved.
There are a diversity of views
regarding the Treaty of SADC as
a mandate (e.g., with respect to
community involvement).
Viewing the Treaty of SADC as a
mandate is largely based on a
nation-state’s political will and
capacity to implement the
agreement as well as the
necessity to view the agreement
as a mandate.

• Political will
• Capacity
Limiting factors of
implementation
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The implementation of
international agreements
related to TFCAs is
dependent upon a nation
state’s political will and

capacity to do so.

The potential role of SADC

• Mediator
• Set regional TFCA
standards
• Protecting community
rights
• Coordinate donor
funding
• Capacity
• Strong vs. weak role
• Peace Parks Foundation
partnership

The Southern Africa
Development Community could
potentially fulfill several roles
including:
• Mediator between
participating nation
states.
• Setting regional
standards for TFCAs
• Protecting community
rights through protocols
and agreements
• Coordinating donor
funding
While most nation-states would
like to see SADC play some role
in TFCA initiatives, most would
like to see SADC play a
secondary role.

The potential role of
African Union

•
•
•
•

Continental charter
Normalized values
Human rights
Political clout

SADC is planning to fulfill some
of these roles through a
partnership with the Peace Parks
Foundation.
Given the African Union’s
continental charter, it is not likely
that they will address regionspecific issues. Rather they will
focus on normalized issues such
as human rights. They will
however be a powerful
organization given their political
clout.

Table 3 - Emergent categories, concepts, and theories

T h e f o llo w in g s e c t io n is d e v o t e d t o e x p a n d in g t h e fin d in g s a n d r e s u lts o f e a c h

c a te g o r y . I n th e c o u r s e o f d o in g s o , a n u m b e r o f q u o te s w ill b e p r o v id e d to

fo r m u la tio n

o f th e o r ie s .

W h ile th e q u o te s h ig h lig h te d b e lo w

su p p o r t th e

a r e n o t a c o m p le t e lis t o f r e le v a n t

r e s p o n s e s , t h e y d o r e p r e s e n t t h e d o m in a n t r e s p o n s e s a n d d is p la y t h e s p e c t r u m

th a t e m e r g e d .
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o f co n c e p ts

Discussion of emergent categories, concepts, and theories

International law and institutional accountability
The principle function of international agreements is to establish a formal system of
international accountability. International accountability, as stated and understood by its
architects, can be defined as liability or responsibility imposed upon a collection of nation
states to carry out a set of actions declared through international law (Slomanson 2003). In
the case of international agreements relevant to TFCAs, this is achieved principally through
three different mechanisms: sanctions, institutional structures, and donors. Each of these
three mechanisms is dramatically different in terms of both effectiveness and evolution
with respect to TFCAs in southern Africa.
The Treaty of SADC states that in any instance where the Treaty is violated,
sanctions may be imposed upon the nation-state in violation. Nevertheless, as several
respondents noted, sanctions are rarely imposed against any nation-state around the world
for violating international law - particularly conservation-based violations (see Box 1). In
essence, conservation based violations simply aren’t considered serious enough to justify
sanctions.
Perhaps the best way to establish accountability is to embed it within the
institutional structures surrounding TFCAs and to create chains of responsibility and
reporting.

Every TFCA memorandum of understanding (MOU) or treaty establishing and

guiding TFCA management has created an organizational framework delineating the way
in which conflicts are resolved and responsibility is delegated. The basic organizational
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model for TFCAs consists of several structures15, including international donors, heads of
state, a ministerial committee, a joint management board, nation-state management
committees, and nation-state task forces (see Fig. 5).

“Granted, sanctions don’t occur often, but I’m sorry to say that I feel that if
there were no sanctions, nothing would happen. In any case where a country
is responsible for it’s actions, if that country doesn’t live up to the promises
they’ve made, there needs to be consequences. Unfortunately, in the
international arena, that doesn’t happen too often.”
“I don’t think they would go that far... It’s not warranted first of all. In the
case of environmental stuff, I think the priority for SADC is peace and
security... These [TFCAs] are further on down the line.”
“Sanctions are rarely imposed with any violations of international law. You
may find that they exist with some instances of law such as significant
human rights violations like in Zimbabwe, but in general, conservation
issues are simply not seen as being important enough to merit the imposition
of sanctions...”
Box 1 - TFCAs and Sanctions

Several respondents noted that accountability is established by (1) progress reporting that
must take place between each connected structure and (2) delegation of responsibility
through these channels (which gives rise to a traceable path of action).
Involvement of donors can be one of the most effective means of instituting
accountability within a TFCA initiative. In every instance where a donor contributes
funding to a TFCA initiative, a formal agreement is established between the donor and the
participating nation-states. Given the pecuniary nature of the agreement, there is a high
level of financial accountability expected through the agreement. Furthermore, since donor

15 The name o f each o f these structures differs across TFCAs, but the fundamental model and mission o f each remains the
same.
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Fig. 5 - TFCA Organizational Structure
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funding for TFCAs often requires specific management actions, implementing agencies are
indirectly accountable to donors for those actions. Officials within Kwa-Zulu Natal
Wildlife noted that the agreement between the Global Environment Facility and the
countries of Lesotho and South Africa is the most detailed and accountable agreement
governing the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area.
Of equal importance, with respect to accountability, is the Ministerial Committee
(composed of the Ministers of Environment, Tourism, and Development of each
participating nation), which guides the overall mission of the TFCA.
Below the Ministerial Committee sits the Joint Management Board composed of
high-ranking officials from land management agencies within each participating State and,
in some TFCAs, a representative from the SADC Secretariat. The goal of this committee is
to assess the principle challenges facing the TFCA and then delegate responsibility to the
nation-state management committees that will act to mitigate those challenges and report
their progress to the Joint Management Board.
The nation-state management committees and task groups carry out the commission
of addressing specific problems facing the TFCA. In most cases, individual task groups
exist for tourism, wildlife management, national security, foreign affairs, and community
issues (Verhoef 2003). In fact, it is the community task force, to which members of
surrounding communities are invited to send representatives, that serves as the community
voice in TFCA matters (Verhoef 2003).

Formalization
Accountability is primarily a function of agreement formalization. For the purpose
of this study,formalization is defined as the creation of written rules that are promulgated
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through a treaty or international agreement and are considered legally binding. Like
implementation of and recognition of agreements, formalization of agreements is
dependent upon a nation-state’s political will and capacity to formalize agreements as well
as it’s perceived necessity to do so.
In theory, the greater the degree of formalization - the greater the degree of
accountability (the contrapositive and converse being true, as well). Despite the benefits of
accountability, formalization is not something that is always desired by nation-states. As
noted by a respondent, cooperation in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park was “much
smoother before there were any agreements.” Considering the context-specific nature of the
desire for formalization, it may be wise to assess the need for agreement formalization prior
to engaging in TFCA initiatives. Provided there is both the capacity and political will for
formalization, below are some initiatial questions that nation-states might consider in
assessing the need for formalization:

1. Is the initiative heavily funded by donors (or could it be)?
If the TFCA is heavily funded, then it might be wise to consider formalizing
agreements to estabilsh a system of financial accountability. If it is not funded,
but could be, formalization will be attractive to potential donors

“One of the main reasons why we have so many formal agreements is
that they are necessary in order for us to receive funding; we have to
have financial accountability. This is particularly true when multiple
countries are involved and we need to track who bears the costs and
receives the benefits.”
“There’s no way we would be able to get any money without an
agreement. If a Transfrontier project wants to receive any sort of
funding, they have to have [an agreement]”
Box 2 - Formalization and donor funding
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2. What are the cross-border management iniatives?
If the management initiatives are substantial, then formalization might be
necessary to establish an organizing framework and management accountabiltiy.

“Transfrontier conservation areas often involve very complex projects and
programs. It’s desirable to have an organizing framework if we’re going to
undertake complex actions. An organization needs to have some sort of
framework to operate effectively”
“A lot of times we hear complaints that agreements and plans create what
you call ‘red-tape,’ and that it is a bad thing. One of the most important
things that I’ve learned is that sometimes that ‘red-tape’ forces us to think
about the actions we are taking. If there were no agreements for these
initiatives, we could potentially make quick decisions, but they stand a
better chance of being bad ones.”
“The Great Limpopo [TFCA] would never be able to implement an
elephant re-location plan without an operational and written plan between
the countries involved.”
“If you’re not going to do anything major, why would you need a formal
agreement? I can see needing a formal agreement for major projects, but
not for anything minor. A lot of that need for formal agreements can be
taken care of by sharing or combining management plans.”
“Yes, it is true that when there are substantial management actions
agreements and treaties can help, but what treaties and agreements must
also do is consider the long-term goals of the area. For the most part, I
don’t see that in any of the agreements. The result is that agreements must
constantly be written and revised. We need some long-term goals.”

Box 3 —Formalization and management actions

3. Is cross-border management already taking place?
If cross-border management is already taking place and (1) few parties are
engaged, (2) no donors are funding the project, (3) no substantial management
actions are taking place, and (4) local communities do not have a vested interest in
the TFCA, then it might not be necessary to formalize agreements.
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“We’ve been cooperating just fine for a very long time, why would we
want to do anything to damage that now? Personally, I don’t see any
need for international law governing [TFCAs] when everything is going
fine”
“Sometimes cooperation is better when there aren’t treaties to get in the
way. International law and other agreements tend to tie things up. Let
me say, however, that if there were major management actions planned
for a transfrontier project, you need some sort of plan. The question,
then, is if that plan should be in the form o f international law. Typically,
what would happen in that case is that the law should maybe state broad
principles and then each country develops a plan of action from those
principles which is more specific.”
“As long as good cooperation is already taking place, I don’t think a
treaty is necessary.”

Box 4 - Formalization and pre-existing cooperation
4. Do surrounding communities have a vested interest?
If surrounding communities have a vested interest in the TFCA project, then it
might be necessary to formalize agreements to establish social accountability.

“If there are local communities in or around the [TFCA] area, how else are
the countries going to be held accountable to them? Many of these
communities have been in a bad situation for a long time and there’s a lot
of mistrust between them and the government. Having some sort of
agreement between them and the government would help to build trust.”
“The good thing about treaties and other agreements is that, theoretically,
they establish a certain dimension of accountability to the communities. I
think in big projects like these parks, it’s warranted.”
“I think we owe it to the communities to sit down and write up agreements,
because often what happens if that agreement doesn’t exist is that they’ll
never be involved. Also, communities will not tolerate not being involved
anymore. So the government has to sit down with community leaders and
come up with agreements.”
Box 5 - Formalization and community interests
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5. How many parties (e.g., agencies and NGOs) are participating in the initiative?
The more parties involved, the more complex the TFCA initiative will be.
Formalization might be required in order to provide an operational framework that
exhibits how responsibility is delegated and establishes managerial and financial
accountability.
“The more agencies and organizations involved, the more complex it
gets, and the greater the need for some sort of organizing agreement...
it’s as simple as that...”
“These projects involve a lot of different organizations, both national
and international, a lot agencies, and communities. When you have so
many different bodies involved, It’s useful to have something guiding
you when you have a number of entities involved in these projects.”
Box 6 - Formalization and multiple party involvement

C o n s id e r in g th e a b o v e r e s p o n s e s , th e d e c is io n t o

c o m p le x ity .
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N e v e r t h e le s s , it is a d e c is io n th a t m u s t b e e ith e r e x p lic id y o r im p lic itly m a d e w it h

B y a a s s e s s in g e a c h q u e s tio n , n a tio n -s ta te s m ig h t b e tte r e q u ip
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th a t fo r m a l a g r e e m e n t as a m a n d a te .

The Treaty o f SADC as a mandate
Despite formalization, international agreements and other pieces of international
law still might not be recognized as a mandate. While a lack of recognition may be
attributed to a number of factors, in general, it is a function of political will and capacity.
Many agreements and treaties have been authored or ratified by nation-states within
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southern Africa, but confusion surrounds a number of them regarding their status as a
mandate. One such treaty is the Treaty of SADC.
To better assess the Treaty of SADC and its Wildlife Protocol as a mandate for
community involvement in TFCA initiatives, perhaps it is best to first acknowledge the
holistic attitudes towards the Treaty of SADC and international law. With the fall of
apartheid in 1994, South Africa (and southern Africa) underwent a political
transformation of massive proportions that eventually centered it as a significant global
actor and re-centered and internationalized its political agendas. Inevitably, with
increased international activity came participation in international agreements and
subjectivity to international law. Participation in international agreements and awareness
and implementation of international law, however, are two separate things (see Box 7).
Furthermore, nearly all implementing agencies within southern Africa, such as South
Africa National Parks or Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks are largely
unaware of the implications of international law.
The unawareness or the lack of acknowledgement of the Treaty of SADC and
international law relevant to TFCAs might, in part, be a manifestation of the apparent
delay in implementation following promulgation. As with virtually all pieces of
international law, critical decisions regarding international law relevant to TFCAs are
made at the Presidential and Ministerial level. And, at both levels, the Treaty of SADC
and its corresponding protocols are recognized by many nation-states in southern Africa
as a mandate. Despite the recognition of the Treaty of SADC as a mandate, though,
policy simply moves faster than implementation in southern Africa (see Box 8).
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“Many countries within southern Africa are new democracies or will be
soon. There’s a lot of good ideas and they want to form these into law.
Countries within southern Africa, however, are much better at creating
international law than implementing it. I would expect that someday,
though, this could change when the capacity is there to implement it.”
“In working with TFCAs, I have never come across anything dealing
with international law to speak of.”
“I’m not entirely sure how international law is connected to transfrontier
parks. I’ve never encountered it. I mean I guess I could see how it would
be relevant since were talking about international projects, but we’ve
never needed it before.”
“When it comes to transboundary conservation initiatives, it
[international law] is not even in our vocabulary. This is changing
though, I think. I believe we’ll find that it’s [international law] necessary
if these things [TFCAs] are going to work”

Box 7 - TFCAs and the awareness of international law

“I think it is an inherent problem with any conservation initiative in
southern Africa, that your community liaison processes are a lot slower
than your political decision making processes. It can take as a long as a
year to simply establish a recognizable community entity and liaison
mechanism with which you can begin to talk.”
“You have to remember that many countries in southern Africa are new
democracies. What this means is that we have a lot of good ideas, but we just
might not have the capacity or means to implement them. I don’t think this will
the be the case forever, but for now it is.”
“I think in many governments the policy moves faster than the on the ground
enactment of that policy. So I would say it is incorrect to say that we are not
implementing any of the agreements. I think we are in the process of doing it;
you just have to be patient.”

Box 8 - International law and implementation
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Furthermore, recognition of the Treaty of SADC as a mandate does not
automatically imply that the connection is made between the Treaty of SADC and the
Wildlife protocol to imply that community involvement is mandated in TFCA initiatives.
Officials from South Africa and Botswana, all of whom stated that their respective
governments acknowledged the Treaty of SADC as international law, differed in their
interpretation with respect to community involvement. All but one respondent claimed
that community involvement in TFCA initiatives was considered a mandate of the Treaty
of SADC and its Wildlife Protocol (see Box 9).
“No, I don’t think that realization [of the Treaty of SADC and its Wildlife
Protocol as a mandate for community involvement] exists. In actual fact, I was
discussing with my peers this morning because they actually wanted to [send]
legislation to the cabinet requesting blanket approval for TFCAs so that the
concept is approved by Cabinet. And, I pointed out that it is already part of the
Wildlife protocol, which has been approved by Cabinet, and ratified by
parliament, and they said it was not a sufficient mandate.”
Box 9 - The Treaty of SADC as a mandate

The respondent continued by stating that he had “never heard of anyone within
the ... government refer to the Wildlife Protocol or the Treaty of SADC as a mandate for
community involvement.” Nevertheless, nearly all nation-states within the southern
African region have national legislation that is well-recognized as mandating community
involvement in all conservation initiatives, and according to one interviewee, “this makes
it very difficult to measure the Treaty of SADC as a mandate - community involvement
is already occurring in several instances and it is virtually impossible to determine what
legislation was considered in implementing community involvement initiatives.”
While there may be discordance among nation-states with respect to the
relationship between SADC and community involvement in transfrontier conservation
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area initiatives, the SADC Secretariat’s office adamantly maintains that a mandate exists
(Enock 2003).

“[Community involvement] is one o f [SADC’s] areas o f intervention in
transfrontier conservation area initiatives, because the establishment of
transfrontier conservation areas is [meant] to improve the life condition of
the community, especially those involved.”

Box 10 —The SADC secretariat and community involvement

Limiting factors o f implementation
Despite the inherent difficulty of assessing the role of SADC in TFCAs and
community involvement, it is evident that community involvement is being implemented
in TFCAs as a result of an abstract corpus of international agreements and national law
and policy including the Treaty of SADC, the Biodiversity Convention, TFCA MOUs
and Treaties, and donor agreements (Verhoef 2003 and Zunckel 2003). However,
implementation is variable across TFCAs in southern Africa and is a function of both
political will and capacity.
As with many pieces of international law, a lack of political will can be the
principal hindrance of implementation. According to one interviewee, “They
[international agreements] started as quite bold statements, but that doesn’t mean that
they will be implemented.” A lack of political will to implement international
agreements relating to TFCAs can be attributed to a variety of reasons (see Box 11).
In addition to unwanted attention, a nation-state’s political will is also a function
of its perception of what it considers to be more pressing issues. As one respondent
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noted, in southern Africa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is currently receiving much more
attention than conservation, and governments typically funnel resources to implement
health and development programs rather than conservation-based programs.
Notwithstanding treaties and agreements relevant to TFCAs, southern Africa’s larger
health and developmental problems must be resolved before implementation of those
agreements can be expected to take place. When asked about the role of SADC and the
African Union in TFCA initiatives, one interviewee responded, “don’t they have more
important things to take care of first?”
A second limiting factor of implementation is a nation-state’s capacity (i.e.,
ability) to implement agreements. The consensus among the respondents was that
southern Africa simply doesn’t have the resources or political consensus at both macroand micro-levels to implement the agreements they have forged.
“There’s somewhat o f a tension between the international community and
the national community. For the Basotho people [of Lesotho], the crossborder movements are economically very important to them, or being able
to rustle cattle and sell Marijuana at the borders is crucial, and I think that
if that was closed off, it would create problems for their politicians back
home. So, there seems to be political will for the transfrontier initiatives
from what I understand, but there seems to be a reluctance to pass law that
would effect these agreements... In many cases, nation-State compliance
would be domestic suicide. So, they don’t go on with it. They’re called
paper parks.”
“A lot of times these parks may sound good on paper, but government may still
not buy into the idea. For example, do governments really want to involve
communities in these [TFCA] projects? I think they should, but the government
may not always think so. There’s a long history hear o f communities and
indigenous people not being involved. I think some traditionalists don’t want to
see that changed. It is changing though, and it’s for the better ”
“Just because it is written down, it doesn’t mean our leaders like it.”

Box 11 —Political will and implementation
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With respect to macro-level resources, donor funding and international assistance was the
most frequently cited need (see Box 12).

“When the Americans were there, they helped greatly with the capacity
building... it worked like a charm while they were there. But, what they
were able to do was to put to put in place a demonstration project [the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project] that worked extremely well for the
period that they were around. They [Lesotho] cannot do it on their own,
that is impossible. The same is true for the Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA.”
“These programs require tremendous capacity. There is no way we can ...
implement them without the assistance of the donor community. We hope
to continue to receive funding because it will make these programs
possible.”
“We need money for TFCAs...”
Box 12 - TFCAs and donor funding

At the micro-level, training emerged as the principle capacity need, particularly
within local communities. According to one respondent, community involvement in TFCA
initiatives should appear in every dimension of the initiatives, including the acquisition of
funds, but “there’s a tremendous amount of capacity that needs to be built to get them to
understand the basic financial management principles to get them in a position where they
are strong enough to write their own funding proposals, to write their own business plans,
etc.”
The respondents comments suggest that implementation of international agreements
relevant to TFCA initiatives is dependent on a nation-state’s political will to implement the
agreements and its capacity to achieve the initiative’s objectives. Nevertheless, attempting
to simultaneously maximize both political will and capacity might not be the best approach.
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Before capacity can be built, political will that would perpetuate the building of that
capacity and permit it to occur, must be present. Thus, implementation regarding
international agreements related to southern Africa TFCAs can be perceived as a linear
process beginning with the promulgation of international agreements occurring either
simultaneously with or before a development of political will (see Fig. 6); the
implementation process is then perpetuated by a development of capacity followed by
explicit implementation.

promulgation
agreements
capacity
building

agreement
implementation

evidence of
political will

Fig. 6 - The Implementation of International Agreements

The potential role o f SADC in TFCA initiatives
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Many respondents noted, however, that they don’t see SADC as

having an active and hands-on approach (see Box 14).
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The Southern African Development Community is responding to all of these
potential roles through two actions: the creation of a SADC TFCA sector and a potential
partnership with the Peace Parks Foundation. The mission of the TFCA sector is to
provide technical expertise to nation-states engaged in TFCA initiatives to serve as a
catalyst for the development of basic standards for TFCAs within the region, and fulfill the
mediator role when conflicts surrounding TFCAs arise. This action has been well received
by nation-states in southern Africa, while the potential partnership with the Peace Parks
Foundation has been inundated with controversy and skepticism.
“... our [SADC’s] role is to facilitate and coordinate in line with our protocols...
So, we act as a depositor to all projects regarding the establishment of transfrontier
conservation areas. This role will become stronger as more TFCAs are established
and we want to be involved in an appropriate and helpful role.”
“Even though we may not view SADC as a mandate, we would still like to see
them involved to a certain level... they could fulfill several roles...”
“It [SADC] could ensure there is a possibility of harmonizing the Treaty
agreements and act as a mediator between countries. It could ensure that in the
TFCAs there are certain regional development objectives being met. Thirdly,
SADC could play a very important role in protecting the rights of communities
and could have more influence than individual countries. It could also coordinate
donor funding or other forms of investment. But, of course, SADC needs to
develop the capacity to do that, which it doesn’t have.”

“When we get to the benefits of the project [The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Area], there might be tensions about who gets
what, which might lead to one party withdrawing. The involvement of such a
body could be as a mediator for such things”

Box 13 - The potential role of SADC
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“The more they [SADC] take on, the less they empower people and they will have
bigger problems in sustaining themselves. Their best role is a light one. By taking
on a light role, the countries can continue to work together but still get the benefits
of having a body like SADC help them.”
“Yes, we would like to see them [SADC] play a role, but it must be a secondary
role. If it is a strong role, communities like we’ve been discussing, will not trust
the process if it’s too centralized. So, I see SADC playing a role, but it has to be a
minor one. But, just because it’s minor doesn’t mean it’s not important.”
“I just don’t see SADC having a strong interest if they do in fact have one. I think
having a real strong interest or role would be self-defeating. Countries must
primarily make the decisions. Any interest that SADC has should be second to
them [countries].”
Box 14 —SADC’s influence

Recognizing the Peace Park Foundation’s success in acquiring funds for TFCAs,
SADC hopes to forge a partnership that would insure the financial viability of both current
and future TFCAs throughout the region. Nevertheless, the partnership is not without
criticism. The Peace Parks Foundation, a private organization and a major broker for
TFCA initiatives, has been labeled as having neo-imperialistic interests. One respondent
provided an example of the expert-driven philosophy they believed the Peace Parks
Foundation embodied (see Box 15). When questioned about this, Wemer Mhyburg,
project coordinator for the Peace Parks Foundation noted, “we have been criticized, but
we’re just here to assist where we can in the establishment of Peace Parks. If our critics
want to talk, let them talk; we’re just here to help.”
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“For community representatives to participate on the actual management of a
national park is something unfair to the community themselves. In most cases the
people that are appointed to manage a national park have gone and done years of
studying to gain a tertiary education. They’re well qualified... I know a lot of critics
are advocating for it [community involvement], but in my mind it is the same as
having someone living next to an airport come and sit next to the air traffic
controller... You can’t make them air traffic controllers.”

Box 15 - The Peace Parks and criticism regarding community involvement

The potential role o f African Union

In addition to SADC, another international organization that has the potential to
play a significant role in TFCA initiatives is the African Union (see Box 16). The key
instrument by which it could play a role is its New Partnership for African Development
Treaty (NEPAD), which is a promulgation of the continent’s desire to move forward with
economic and developmental initiatives. One potential way in which this can be
accomplished in an environmental setting is through TFCA initiatives (Hanks 2003).
Unlike SADC, though, the African Union has a continental constituency which
implies that:
a) The African Union could address more normative issues, such as human rights,
compared to the issue specific concerns of SADC.

b)

The African Union could exercise significant political clout.

c)

The African Union might define principles and practices which SADC might
align itself with and implement.
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“The African Union represents an entire continent where SADC’s jurisdiction is
essentially sub-Saharan Africa. Given that, they can’t address very specific issues;
they can only make broad proclamations. For example, I’m not sure if they will
ever formally make provisions for TFCAs. I know there will be a presentation on
the Great Limpopo at the upcoming [African Union] summit, but I don’t know if
they’ll ever form a mission on them. I think they’re more likely to address
normalized issues given their continental charter, rather than developing regionspecific standards for TFCAs.”
“The African Union has more exposure and more control mechanisms [than SADC]
from the international community and other continents. So, from that point o f view,
they may have more influence than a regional group such as SADC. I think this is
particularly true with NEPAD. There’s a lot o f excitement surrounding [NEPAD]
and if countries have the capacity to implement [NEPAD] it could be a great thing.”
“The most critical role that they [the African Union] can play is that they have an
impact on legislation pertaining to the rights of individuals within Africa. I don’t
think it’s within their realm or responsibility to develop rules for TFCAs. But the
rules they do develop could substantially effect [TFCAs]”
“I wouldn’t differentiate too much between SADC and the African Union. I see
SADC as a subset of the African Union and it should be implementing the principles
of the Union.”
“What we want to do is to align SADC’s initiatives with the African Union’s and
work with and through them.”

Box 16 - TFCAs and the African Union

Variability of results among study sites
As is evident from the preceding discussion, there was very little distinction made
between respondents who were associated with different study sites. One of the most
interesting results from this study was the lack of variability of responses from individuals
associated with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as compared to those associated with the
Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area. In fact there was
no significant difference among the respondents notwithstanding questions concerning
formalization of agreements. With respect to formalization, it was clear that individuals
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associated with or speaking in terms of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park desired
formalization of agreements to a much lesser extent than those involved with the MalotiDrakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area. This might be attributed
to a number of factors including:

•

The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has been a de facto TFCA since 1948, whereas
the Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area was
only established in 2001. Officials from the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park feel that
management of the TFCA has been going very well without formalized agreements
and despite its formal establishment in 1999, they see no need to formalize
agreements concerning the area.

•

The Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area
appears to be receiving much more donor funding than the Kgalagadi Transfrontier
Park and, thus, requires more formalization.

•

There appears to be a greater number of parties involved with the MalotiDrakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area than the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park. The larger number of parties involved with the MalotiDrakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area magnify the
complexity of the initiative and necessitates formal agreements to guide the actions
of those parties.
These differences provide interesting insight into the contextual circumstances for

each TFCA. Based on the analysis of the data gathered for this study, the MalotiDrakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area is a TFCA that requires a high degree of
formalization, whereas the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has thus far resisted efforts to
formalize many agreements. As was anticipated in this study’s infancy, both TFCAs have
provided for a thought-provoking and useful contrast.
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Key insights
In summary, the data and discussion presented above reveal a number of key
insights regarding the role of international law in TFCAs and it’s role in community
involvement within those areas:

1. The foundation for accountability in TFCA initiatives is established vis-a-vis
international agreements and the required institutional structures established
through those agreements, one of the strongest agreements being that between
participating nation-states and the donor(s).
2. The need for formalization of international agreements related to TFCA initiatives
is context specific and dependent upon:
a. donor funding;
b. the nature of cross-border management initiatives;
c. local community interest in TFCA initiatives; and
d. the number of parties involved in a TFCA initiative.
3. While most respondents within southern Africa recognize the Treaty of SADC as
international law, it is questionable as to whether or not the Treaty, along with the
Wildlife Protocol, are viewed as a mandate for community involvement in TFCA
initiatives. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to determine if existing
community involvement is a result of national or international mandates.
4. Implementation and recognition of international law (or lack thereof) is principally
a function of implementation capacity and political will.
5. Nation-states in southern Africa would like to see SADC play a role in TFCA
initiatives. This role might include:
a. Acting as a mediator between nation-states engaged in TFCA initiatives
b. Protecting the rights of communities in and around TFCAs
c. Coordinating donor funding
d. Setting regional standards for TFCAs
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6. In addition to SADC, the African Union also could play a role in TFCA initiatives.
Unlike SADC, though, the African Union, as a continental organization, will be
more inclined to address normalized issues rather than region-specific concerns.
The summary of findings above implies that the interface between international law
and TFCAs is both complex and substantially rooted in notions of political will and
capacity. Furthermore, a nation-state’s decision to recognize certain pieces of international
law as a mandate are dependent upon their desire to formalize agreements that may or may
not have previously existed. Responses from individuals associated with the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park and the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and
Development Area have illustrated the importance of looking beyond surface observations
and deeper into the motivations for observing international law as a mandate and call to
action. Through this study, perhaps a better understanding of these motivations can be
reached that will lead to an greater appreciation of TFCAs as a valuable tool for
conservation world-wide.

Chapter

5

CONCLUSION

Transfrontier conservation areas in southern Africa have pioneered a means of
large-scale conservation that could potentially provide a number of benefits ranging from
increased peace between nation-states within the region to the restoration of historic
wildlife migration routes. Given that most of the benefits touted by proponents require
significant management actions between sovereign entities, organizational frameworks
establishing more accountability than a general management plan will be necessary to
bind nation-states to action. In theory, international law establishes such a framework.
While international law may be an appropriate venue for these needs, it is not without
challenges.
As demonstrated through this study, the challenges of international law are
particularly apparent with respect to community involvement in TFCA initiatives.
Generally speaking, nation-states view international agreements - such as the Treaty of
SADC - as international law, but disagreement exists among nation-states regarding the
legitimacy of specific provisions related to community involvement in TFCA initiatives.
As indicated by the respondents, the lack of recognition and implementation of
provisions related to community involvement are, largely, a function of a nation-states
desire to formalize agreements.
The desire for formalization, as an impetus for agreement recognition and
implementation is further dependent upon a nation-states capacity and political will to
formalize agreements as well as it’s perceived necessity to formalize. Assuming there is
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both political will and capacity to formalize agreements, the five questions raised in the
previous chapter regarding the necessity of formalization could potentially serve as the
foundation for a useful model to assess the need for agreement formalization (see Figure

7
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Figure 7 - A model to assess the need for formalized agreements in TFCA
initiatives
In implementing this model, nation-states must systematically consider each
question and the implications of respective answers. While “Is the initiative heavily
funded, or could it be?” serves as the starting point on this model, the ordering of the
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questions is arbitrary and not important; the result will be the same under any ordering.
While the ordering is not important, given that each question motivates a particular
dimension of formalization, nation-states must consider all of the questions. For instance,
if it is decided that formalization must occur on account of the potential for donor
funding, nation-states may still want to consider other questions such as “Do
communities or other parties have a vested interest in the initiative” since responses to
these questions will shape the formalization of an agreement, as well.
Despite decisions to not formalize agreements and any lack of recognition and
implementation of SADC’s provisions, nation-states envisage international governmental
organizations, such as SADC and the African Union, playing a larger role in transfrontier
conservation than they do at present. Possible expanded roles could include third-party
mediation, conflict resolution, coordinating donor funding, setting regional TFCA
standards, and protecting the rights of communities in and around TFCAs. An in-depth
analysis of the logistics behind international governmental organization involvement in
TFCA initiatives is among the needed TFCA-based research.
In addition to an in-depth analysis of the role of international governmental
organizations in transfrontier conservation, the respondents cited several research needs
concerning transfrontier conservation areas. Two of the most frequently mentioned
research needs were:
1. an analysis of the necessary conditions and specific needs for cross-border
community involvement in transfrontier conservation areas compared to that of
domestic community involvement in national protected areas and
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2. the implications of transfrontier conservation for national security (and vice
versa).
The re-establishment of community relations severed by colonial boundaries has
been one of the most vocalized benefits of TFCA initiatives. A component of the re
establishment of these relations is cross-border community involvement in the joint
management of TFCAs. As opposed to domestic community involvement in
conservation initiatives, cross-border community involvement requires communities from
multiple nation-states to collectively organize their mutual interests and cooperatively
participate in the management of a TFCA. Currently, little is being done by nation-states
to actively engage cross-border community involvement. This is in part due to a lack of
understanding concerning the different necessary conditions and specific needs for crossborder community involvement as compared to domestic community involvement. The
respondents noted that a more thorough understanding of the nature of cross-border
community involvement is necessary in order to understand why it is currently not being
implemented to the desired extent.
The respondents also noted a need to assess the relationship between TFCAs and
the idea of national security. Infringements on national security in TFCAs in southern
Africa currently range from drug smuggling in the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Area to illegal immigration in the Great Limpopo
Transfrontier Conservation Area. Ironically, both national security and TFCA initiatives
are designed to ensure, facilitate, and promote peace between nation-states (albeit through
different means), but a more thorough understanding of the tradeoffs and conflicting
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objectives associated with both frameworks is needed before either one can be considered a
success in southern Africa.
The popularity of and interest in transfrontier conservation in southern Africa has
surged during the past decade, primarily on account of the myriad benefits that they could
potentially provide. Despite this recent attention, many of the conditions impeding the
realization of those benefits have not been adequately identified. The uncertainty of the
role of community involvement in TFCA initiatives in the context of international law
presents only a subset of challenges facing these areas. This study has proposed that some
of the important issues to consider with respect to TFCAs and international law are the
desire for agreement formalization, the importance of political will and capacity, and
determining the appropriate role for international organizations. Future research must also
focus on broader socio-political and socio-cultural implications and how best to implement
cross-border initiatives while preserving nation-state sovereignty. By doing so, TFCAs
could be one of the most effective tools for conservation within the southern African region
and they also might provide a conservation paradigm capable of being implemented
worldwide.

93

Appendix

Interviewees

•

Vupenyo Dzingirai; Cultural Anthropologist, IUCN; Zimbabwe

•

Bill Bainbridge; Former employee of Kwa-Zulu Natal Wildlife intimately
involved in the establishment of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier
Conservation and Development Area; South Africa

•

Malcom Draper, Professor, University of Natal; South Africa

•

Kevan Zunckel; South African Coordinator, The Maloti-Drakensberg
Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area, KZN Wildlife; South Africa

•

Mike Kidd, Professor of Environmental Law, University of Natal School of Law;
South Africa

•

Derek Potter, Head of Conservation, KZN Wildlife; South Africa

•

Johan Verhoef, Coordinator, The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation
Area, South Africa National Parks; South Africa

•

Marind van Graan, Legal Specialist, South Africa National Parks; South Africa

•

Ernest Mokganedi, Director, Transfrontier Conservation Areas, South Africa
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism; South Africa

•

Manuel Enock, Forestry aud Wildlife Expert, SADC Secretariat; Zimbabwe

•

Jan Broekhuis, Assistant Director, Botswana Department of Wildlife and
National Parks; Botswana
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•

Trevor Sandwith, Director, CAPE Action and former South African Coordinator
for the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area;
South Africa

•

Werner Myburg, Project Coordinator, Peace Parks Foundation; South Africa

•

Motsami Damane, Director, Lesotho National Environment Secretariat; Lesotho

•

Saliem Fakir, Director, IUCN - South Africa; South Africa
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